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Abstract 
 
Gang violence in British Columbia poses a significant concern for law enforcement 
agencies and the public. In response to this violence, the Restaurant Watch program, a targeted 
enforcement strategy that deters unwanted gang-involved patrons from attending participating 
restaurants, was created and implemented in the city of Vancouver. The current study examined 
this program and its perceived effectiveness by key stakeholders. Data for this study was 
collected by conducting semi structured interviews with key stakeholders who enforce and 
participate in the program. The program’s objectives and operations were explored in the context 
of the gang landscape in British Columbia. Given that the Restaurant Watch program is unique, 
the author draws on the findings of other anti-gang deterrent projects, such as the Operation 
Ceasefire and the London’s Operation Shield, to explain and analyze the program’s objectives 
and methods. The findings suggest that the program is successful due to three important themes: 
(1) the impact on public safety; (2) the importance of partnership and open dialogue and; (3) the 
ability to deter inadmissible patrons from participating establishments.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This is in the height of their level of violence. [A gang member] bumps me as I come 
walking down the stairs. Doesn’t know who I am. I’m sitting there looking at them as 
they sit over . . . well my mom has no idea who these people are. I know who they are. 
Should I be worried right now? I was. Then I got mad. Why can’t I go out for lunch and 
be comfortable, and those guys are totally comfortable hitting on waitresses, right, and 
just sitting there. Why do they get to go out? They haven’t earned any of that money. 
How can I take that away from them? And then it just starts the question. It’s like here’s 
something I see, how can I take it away? What do you need to do? How do I make it so 
that patrol member [patrol police officers] can walk in here and walk up and say, “Get 
out”? What do we need to do? That’s how these things start. That’s how this one started 
(Interview Participant, personal communication, December 12, 2016). 
This study examines the Restaurant Watch program in the city of Vancouver BC. This 
program was created to target gang members dining at popular Vancouver restaurants and in 
doing so, to respond to the ongoing concerns expressed by restaurant owners and police about 
the risk of victimization gang members brought with them in public places. Designed as a public 
safety initiative, the program allows for police officers to eject individuals from participating 
establishments, thus reducing the risk of violence.  
The program was initiated in response to a number of high profile gang violence 
incidents that had occurred in restaurants, bars, and nightclubs in the city of Vancouver (Baily, 
2012; Bains, 2013; Bolan, 2015; Skelton, 2009). Between 1987 and 2014, 86 people were 
victimized by serious violence (shot or stabbed) in or around licenced premises in the city of 
Vancouver alone (McConnell, 2015). In response to the growing concern of gang related 
violence, and in an effort to deter gang members from entering such establishments, the 
Restaurant Watch program was created and implemented as a community based initiative.  
The current study uses an exploratory and descriptive research design to examine the 
perceived effectiveness of the Restaurant Watch program. The key stakeholders interviewed in 
this study included restaurant owners and managers who participate in the program, and the 
police officers who enforce the program. Three themes emerged from the research: the impact on 
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public safety, partnership and dialogue, and deterrence on inadmissible patrons from 
participating establishments. Given that there are few programs like Restaurant Watch, this study 
reviewed the strategies implemented by anti-gang deterrent projects such as the Operation 
Ceasefire and the London’s Shield Operation to further draw on similarities. The main research 
questions were designed to explore the effectiveness of the program as it relates to public safety, 
to understand why establishments decided to participate in the program, how the program has 
impacted participating establishments, and whether the program was successful in deterring 
gang-related violence. 
This thesis includes six chapters: Chapter 1 provides background information on the 
Restaurant Watch program, its objectives and how the program operates as a public safety 
initiative. Chapter 2 explores the literature on BC gangs and reviews the relevant theoretical 
perspectives. Chapter 3 introduces the methodological approach used in this study. Chapter 4 
analyses the data from the interviews conducted with restaurant and police participants. Chapter 
5 discusses the research findings. Chapter 6 offers recommendations, explores policy 
implications, and identifies the research limitations. 
The Barwatch Program 
A community-based initiative, the Barwatch Program (Centre for Problem-Oriented 
Policing, n.d.) was originally formed in December 1995 after a series of violent events that 
occurred in bars and nightclubs in Vancouver, BC. The issue of gang-related violence in 
downtown Vancouver establishments began after some violent events were publicized in the 
media. In December of 1998, the high profile shooting at Vancouver’s Palladium Nightclub left 
notorious gangster Bindy Johal1 dead on the dance floor with 300 other patrons inside the club 
                                                          
1 Bhupinder "Bindy" Singh Johal was an Indian born gangster raised in British Columbia, Canada. A self 
admitted drug trafficker; he was known for his outspoken nature and blatant disregard for authority. 
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and scrambling to get out (Canadian Broadcast Corporation [CBC], 1998). Similarly, in 
September 2005, another high-profile incident occurred at the Tonic nightclub, where members 
of the Independent Soldiers gang and the United Nations gang, attacked one another with bar 
stools, leaving the club covered in blood and broken bottles (Bolan, 2005). In addition to these 
highly publicized events, a number of pubs, bars, and clubs began to see high numbers of 
assaults and general disorder in the Granville Entertainment District 2part of Vancouver. 
Licensed establishments in the Vancouver area had concerns about the risk of violent crimes in 
bars and the challenges in dealing with problematic patrons, including known gang members. 
One of the biggest challenges was trying to eject undesirable patrons, who in return used 
intimidation or force to enter the premises (Vancouver Police Department [VPD], 2009a). 
The Barwatch program’s formation was based primarily on a partnership between the 
VPD and bars, pubs, and clubs in the downtown area of Vancouver in an effort to promote safety 
and the security of patrons within these establishments (VPD, 2009a). The program is voluntary 
and requires participating establishments to attend meetings once a month and pay an annual fee 
of $1,000 to cover program administration costs (City of Nanaimo, 2014). Moreover, the 
program is governed by a non-profit Bar Watch Society, which is established under the British 
Columbia Societies Act. Each establishment participating in the Barwatch program is required to 
install CCTV (video cameras) in the entrance alongside a Barwatch decal to inform individuals 
who are entering the premises that the establishment is a part of the program and that all activity 
is monitored. All Barwatch establishments have the ability to share information with each other 
about problematic patrons and deny entry based on specific criteria and prior history. Through a 
signed agreement between Barwatch and the VPD, police officers are able to remove individuals 
                                                          
2 The Granville Entertainment District (GED) is the densest collection and the primary entertainment area 
in Vancouver that has the highest concentration of liquor seats in the Lower Mainland. 
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from Barwatch establishments so owners and staff can avoid violent incidents from occurring 
within the establishments (VPD, 2007a).  
Although there has been no formal evaluation of the effectiveness of the Barwatch 
program, it continues to operate in Vancouver, and many other cities within British Columbia 
have adapted the program, including Kelowna, Vancouver, Abbotsford, Chilliwack, Langley, 
West Vancouver, Nanaimo, Port Moody, and Victoria (City of Kelowna, 2003; City of Nanaimo, 
n.d; Peebles, 2011; Port Moody Police, 2014). While other cities have Barwatch, Vancouver is 
the only city to separate the programs to target bars and restaurants distinctively.  
As gang-related shootings started to occur in restaurants downtown Vancouver, not only 
was this becoming a problem for the police but also the restaurant industry, who were concerned 
about innocent bystanders being targets of gang violence. Today, the Restaurant Watch program 
is the only one of its kind to eject inadmissible patrons out of restaurant establishments. There 
does not appear to be any formal evaluations conducted on the program and little literature to 
suggest that it is effective to any extent.  
The Emergence of the Restaurant Watch Program 
The Restaurant Watch Program was created by a VPD police officer in 2008 after a string 
of public shootings that occurred in the city of Vancouver. The police officer that created the 
Restaurant Watch program was curious as to whether a program like Barwatch could be adapted 
to include restaurants, as gang members were often found dining in some of Vancouver’s 
popular eateries. In October 2007, the officer attended various prominent restaurants in the 
downtown Vancouver area to determine whether restaurant owners would be interested in 
participating in a similar program focused on restaurants. The restaurant owners expressed an 
interest in responding to the presence of gang members attending their establishments, as they 
 5 
 
felt that gang members were putting others at risk as they were often associated with violence 
and victimization from rival gang members (Interview participant, personal communication, 
December 12, 2016). With the goal of public safety in mind, the VPD and restaurant owners in 
the city of Vancouver decided to send a very clear message to the community that if “you’re a 
gangster . . . a drug dealer . . . have a history of violence . . . you’re not welcome here [in 
restaurants]” (Hodson, 2008, para. 3). 
To date, there have been no evaluations of the Restaurant Watch program, and there are 
no evaluations available for similar operating programs, such as the Barwatch program. 
Although this thesis does not provide a comprehensive evaluation of the program, it contributes 
knowledge to the literature on crime reduction and it provides an assessment regarding the 
program’s efficacy from the perspectives of key stakeholders.  
Restaurant Watch Objectives 
The objectives of the Restaurant Watch program focus on three principles: patron safety, 
staff safety, and public safety. The objectives are to (a) reduce the threat of collateral violence to 
restaurant patrons by deterring individuals who pose a risk to public safety; (b) reduce the 
interaction, intimidation, fear, and harassment between restaurant staff and individuals who pose 
a risk to public safety and; (c) deter public violence caused by organized crime groups and their 
associates by making it known that they are unwelcome and will be removed (VPD, 2016a). 
How the Restaurant Watch Program Works  
The Restaurant Watch program is a voluntary-based program and is of no cost to 
participants. Interested establishment owners are educated via meetings and workshops on the 
risks associated with gang activity and are informed of the potential risks that gangsters pose 
when dining in their establishments. The legal framework of the Restaurant Watch program 
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relies on sections 1, 4, 8, and 10 of the British Columbia Trespass Act of 1996 (British Columbia 
Trespass Act, 2010), whereby the owner/occupier or agent of the restaurant, which is considered 
a private establishment, can authorize any person to act on their behalf to eject an individual. In 
this scenario, the VPD becomes the “authorized person” who is permitted to remove 
inadmissible patrons on behalf of the participating establishment (VPD, 2016).  
Participating restaurant owners follow specific protocols if they have reason to believe 
that someone is known or suspected to be an associate of a gang member or involved in serious 
criminal activities (VPD, 2016). If the police are called to an establishment to remove an 
inadmissible patron, specific procedures are followed (See Figure 1). Upon arrival, officers will 
approach the table and ask the patron(s) for identification. Patrons within the establishment are 
not legally required to provide identification to the authorized person; however, the 
establishment’s owner is able to create specific rules and regulations for that establishment, 
similar to rules such as the no shirt, no shoes, and no service rule. For that reason, participating 
establishments have their own rules that allow patrons to be asked for identification. If patrons 
refuse to provide identification, the police advise the patrons that they will no longer be served 
and will be asked to leave the premises. Consequently, if the patrons choose not to leave, they 
are notified that by not complying with the request, they are deemed to be trespassing (VPD, 
2016). In cases where the inadmissible patrons do not leave, the patrons can be found to have 
committed an offence under Section 4 of the Trespass Act and, as a result, can be subject to 
arrest under Section 10 of the British Columbia Trespass Act (2010) (VPD, 2016).  
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Figure 1. Vancouver Police Department Ejection Flowchart. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. The figure was provided in a personal communication with K. McConnell, VPD, on 
December 6, 2016. Reprinted with author’s permission. 
 
All members participating in the program sign the Restaurant Watch/Inadmissible Patron 
Agreement; the agreement is signed by either the owner or a designated representative of the 
participating restaurant (VPD, 2016). Signing the agreement allows for members of the VPD and 
its partner police agencies to act on behalf of the establishments to deny entry and/or remove 
inadmissible patrons using the British Columbia Trespass Act (VPD, 2016). 
The Restaurant Watch Program identifies “inadmissible patron[s]” as individuals whose 
lifestyles, associations, and activities pose a risk to public safety, either directly or from third 
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parties (VPD, 2016). The Restaurant Watch Authorization Agreement (RWAA) utilizes specific 
wording of “individuals known to be associated to or involved in serious and/or violent criminal 
activities” to reflect the definition (VPD, 2016, p. 4). As per the RWAA (VPD, 2016), the 
ejection criteria for an inadmissible patron under the Restaurant Watch Program is as follows:  
• Organized Crime and Gang members; 
• Associates of Organized Crime and/or Gangs; 
• Involvement in the drug trade; 
• History of serious and/or violent criminal activity; or 
• History of firearms offenses  
Additionally, the agreement allows for the VPD and its partner police agencies to 
identify, investigate, and determine if an individual or group meets the criteria for ejection (VPD, 
2016). Although the Restaurant Watch program does operate independently, it is similar to that 
of the Barwatch program that also allows for police to eject inadmissible patrons from the 
participating establishment.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The Complexity of Defining the Term “Gangs” 
The phenomenon of gangs is not new and has been studied by researchers around the 
world. The existence of gangs dates back to the 14th and 15th centuries, including in European 
cities that saw the emergence of early gang activity (Ezeonu, 2014). In the 19th century, gangs 
were identified in major American cities, such as Chicago, Los Angeles, Boston, New York, and 
Philadelphia (Howell, 2012).  
One of the most significant contributions to the gang literature was the pioneering work 
by Thrasher (1927/2013), who was considered to be one of the first academics to study the 
phenomenon of gangs from a sociological paradigm (Decker & Van Winkle, 1996). In his study, 
The Gang: A Study of 1,313 Gangs in Chicago, Thrasher (1927/2013) examined the phenomenon 
of gangs by analyzing different urban neighbourhoods in the city of Chicago. His research 
identified a link between gangs and their sociological upbringings. Specifically, it was noted that 
the majority of the gangs that emerged in the city were a result of “spontaneous efforts of boys to 
create a society for themselves where none adequate to their needs exists” (Thrasher, 1927/2013, 
p. 37). Thrasher’s (1927/2013) research on gangs was one of the first significant contributions in 
trying to understand how gangs were formed, and he defined gang formation as, 
The gang is an interstitial group originally formed spontaneously, and then integrated 
through conflict. It is characterized by the following types of behavior: meeting face to 
face, milling, movement through space as a unit, conflict and planning. The result of this 
collective behavior is the development of tradition, unreflective internal structures, esprit 
de corps, solidarity, moral, group awareness, and attachment to a local territory 
(Thrasher, 1927/2013, p. 57). 
According to Thrasher (1927/2013), gang activity was emerging where youth in urban 
areas came from lower socioeconomic environments and recognized that they were unlikely to 
obtain status, which was valued by the middle class. As a result, these youth created a gang 
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culture of their own that was viewed as being an alternative to improve their material and social 
status in order to meet that status quo (Thrasher, 1927/2013). 
In contrast to the early gang-oriented research emerging from the United States in the 
1920s and 1930s, Canadian interest in studying and targeting gangs was not particularly strong 
until the 1990s when various media and police organizations attributed a wave of street shootings 
in several cities to youth gangs (Ezeonus, 2014). Although there appears to be a vast amount of 
research about gangs in the United States, Canadian literature on the phenomena of gangs is 
limited (Ezeonus, 2014). Many scholars argue that there does not appear to be a universal 
definition of gangs (Gordon, 2000; Prowse, 2012), and, as Canadian researcher Gordon (2000) 
contended, this is in fact a limitation for gang research. 
In the 1998 study Criminal Business Organizations, Street Gangs and Related Groups in 
Vancouver: The Report of The Greater Vancouver Gang Study (Gordon, Foley, BC Ministry of 
Attorney General [BCMoAG], & Department of Justice [DoJ]), the authors defined different 
groups, including youth groups, criminal groups, wannabe groups, street gangs, and criminal 
business organizations. The report described that criminal groups are usually clusters of friends 
who band together for a short period of time to commit crimes for the sake of financial gain. 
Next, wannabe groups are described as young people who band together in a loosely structured 
group to partake in criminal activity, including collective violence against other groups of youths 
(Gordon et al., 1998). A wannabe group will be highly visible, and its members will brag about 
their gang involvement because they want to be seen by others as gang members. In contrast, 
street gangs are groups of young people and adults who band together to form a semi-structured 
organization in order to engage in planned and profitable criminal behaviours or organized 
violence against rival street gangs (Gordon et al., 1998). Finally, the report identified criminal 
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business organizations as displaying formal structure and high degrees of sophistication. These 
groups are comprised of adults who engage in criminal activity, primarily for economic reasons 
(Gordon et al., 1998). Although the authors classified the different gang typologies, it is 
important to note that all criminal activity has the potential for violence. Regardless of a gang’s 
profile, the nature of violence in Vancouver has been quite diverse in the sense that both high 
and low profile gangsters have been seen participating in gang-related violence (The Canadian 
Press, 2007). Often, the nature of their lifestyle is such that one of the few places of vulnerability 
is to ambush them in public places, including restaurants.  
Similarly, in more recent work, Prowse (2012) developed a gang typology based on 
interview data she collected. She suggested that there are three different types of gang 
typologies: (a) organized crime groups made up of a close-knit group with criminal associations 
who engage in criminal enterprises; (b) new-age gangs, which are loose-knit and fluid groups of 
associates who comprise a subset of a street gang leader’s enduring social network and; (c) 
action-set gangs who are unorganized and generally young (under the age of 18), made up of 
potential criminal participants, known to the street gang leader through a social network of 
relations (Prowse, 2012, p. 21). Despite the lack of a universal definition, Prowse (2012) argued 
that it is important to consider typologies in terms of various degrees of structure, organization, 
duration, and collective identity, as knowing what gang typologies are present in a community 
will influence what kinds of anti-gang strategies should be implemented by policy makers.  
Law enforcement agencies across Canada also have varied definitions of gangs. For 
instance, the Montreal Police Service’s definition of gangs is inclusive of anti-social and 
delinquent behaviours. Accordingly, gangs are defined as “an organized group of adolescents or 
adults who rely on group intimidation and violence, and commit criminal acts in order to gain 
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power and recognition and/or control certain areas of unlawful activity” (Public Safety Canada, 
2007, p. 1). Other law enforcement agencies, such as the VPD and the Combined Forces Special 
Enforcement Unit in British Columbia (CFSEU-BC), use a more specific definition that defines a 
gang as, 
An organized group of three or more, that as one of its main purposes or main activities, 
the facilitation or commission of one or more serious offences, that, if committed, would 
likely result in the direct or indirect receipt of a material benefit, including financial 
benefit, by the group or by any one of the group persons who constitutes the group 
(CFSEU, 2015, para. 1). 
Moreover, in his research on the construction of gangs in BC, McConnell (2015) found 
that while the task of defining a gang is difficult, it becomes even more challenging to 
distinguish whether a group is behaving as a gang or as an organized crime group. Furthermore, 
terms such as gang-involved are also used interchangeably. Gordon et al. (1998) argued that 
“gang-involved” individuals could be viewed as gang leaders, core members, associates, or 
peripheral or associate members. Additionally, individuals who are gang-involved do not 
necessary need to be a part of gang but they can also be viewed as independent contractors that 
provide gangs with a specific service (Gordon et al., 1998). These different types of groups can 
also be seen in BC, where some individuals involved in public shootings have been identified in 
the media as gang-involved and have been recognized as gang members, associates, and even 
affiliates of different gangs at different times.  
A Contemporary Look at Gangs  
While the works of Thrasher (1927/2013), Miller (1981), and Klein (1971) presented 
some of the most important contributions to understanding gangs, there appears to be a lack of 
research examining the more contemporary phenomena of gangs or, as Prowse (2012) described, 
“new-age” gangs. Prowse (2012), a former 25-year police officer with the Calgary Police Service 
and an assistant professor of Anthropology at the University of Calgary, studied new-age gangs 
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in the 21st century by analyzing a culmination of intensive interviews with informants over a 
period of time of 15 years, both during her career as a police officer and after she left the 
profession. She also participated in the observations of protection extortions and police take-
downs of suspected gang players (Prowse, 2012). Prowse found that new-age gangs increasingly 
capitalized on networks of associates built from established patterns of kinship, trade, and shared 
experience. In addition, Prowse (2012) added that although there may be a level of structure 
within the new-age gangs, the structure has gradually evolved from a fixed criminal membership 
to one that is mobile and involves a network of gang “players” in pursuit of criminal 
opportunities (p. 1). Prowse referred to players as a configuration similar to members of a sports 
team, where individuals are mobile and interchangeable. She suggested that although the new-
age gangs may have some dedicated gang members, the new-age gangs are seen as players who 
may switch to different teams and work with other gangs for the sake of conducting business and 
making money (Prowse, 2012).  
To reiterate, the above research highlights that gangs are not only more fluid, but possess 
a level of mobility in which they transcend across police jurisdictions in the pursuit of criminal 
activity and money and for that reason, “new age gangs” may not fit well into traditional 
definitions and or typologies. This is important to note because although Vancouver may have 
some traditional structured gangs, the literature suggests that gangs in BC demonstrate a level of 
fluidity and are more likely to transcend across police jurisdictions for financial gain. 
This type of inter-changeability and networking for the sake of making money has been 
seen in new-age gang players who have been targets of gang shootings in BC. In the 2012 
shooting of gangster Jonathan Bacon, members of the Hells Angels, Independent Soldiers, and 
Red Scorpions were discussing business in a parked vehicle when they were targeted in the 
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daytime shooting at the Grand Delta Hotel and Resort in Kelowna (Bolan & Law, 2012). Despite 
the fact the three were known to be involved in three different gangs, these individuals were 
frequently seen together across Metro Vancouver and it was suggested that they were working 
together (Bolan & Law, 2012).  
Morselli (2009) and Bouchard, Morselli, Hashimi, and Ouellet (2016) examined criminal 
network operations and structures that have evolved beyond the traditional structure (i.e., the 
boss or kingpin model). Specifically, that contemporary gangs display the ability to engage in 
illicit activities with a network of accomplices or co-offenders, as opposed to a single gang 
leader (Bouchard et al., 2016). By focusing on social relations, gang members are networking to 
obtain access to a wider range of suppliers and potential accomplices in order to maximize 
capital. With networking being more prevalent in today’s new-age gangs, the violence associated 
with these networks has continued to be of concern. Having a large group of networks increases 
the chances of a gang’s exposure to competition and could result in safety concerns, specifically 
victimization of the gang members through violence.  
McConnell (2015) suggested that in BC, it is difficult to define a gang network because 
unlike his observations in Chicago, Los Angeles, London, Toronto, and Hobbema, gangs in BC 
lack the same structure, geographical areas, recruiting, and criminal activity that exists in other 
places. Moreover, Prowse (2012) and Bouchard et al. (2015) noted that gangs today, such as 
those in BC, are not territory based defending their neighbourhood; they are network based in the 
movement and sale of illegal commodities. Further, as gang members in BC are seen working 
alongside other gangs for the sake of financial gain, it could be argued that these individuals are 
more exposed, ultimately leaving them vulnerable to violence from rivalries.  
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Decker and van Winkle (2006) pointed out that gang members are more likely to be 
engaged in violent conflicts as opposed to other offenders, regardless of whether they are the 
offender or the victim. For gangs, using violence and intimidation can lead to power and money 
and is subsequently seen as a way to further advance within a criminal organization (Beare & 
Hogg, 2013).  
Although this thesis does not go into great depth about the motivations for joining a gang, 
it is important to note that there appear to be different motivations to join gangs in BC than in 
other provinces and countries. While a large body of research, including Thrasher’s preliminary 
work, has identified motivational factors for gang membership, an exhaustive examination of this 
research is outside the scope of this paper. However, in an effort to examine the relevance of the 
Restaurant Watch Program, local motivations must be explored more thoroughly as it helps 
understand how the program is perceived to be effective.  
Beare and Hogg (2013) noted that although there is an extensive amount of research on 
why people join gangs, the literature provides a fairly uniform list, including peer pressure, 
status, protection, lack of alternatives, and money as the key explanatory factors. Studies in the 
United States have examined family socioeconomic status (i.e., poverty), family structural 
characteristics (e.g., single family homes and structures), ethnicity, parenting styles, negative 
influences (e.g., family members/peers involved in gangs) and their influence in increasing the 
risk of future gang membership (Esbensen, Peterson, Taylor, & Freng, 2009; Howell & Egley, 
2005; Klein & Maxson, 2006; O’Brien, Daffern, Chu, & Thomas, 2013; Thornberry, Krohn, 
Lizotte, & Chard-Wierschem, 1993). Although these causal factors apply to many cities in the 
United States and perhaps even some in Canada, they are not necessarily true of gangs in BC. In 
fact, McConnell (2015) and Sanchez-Jankowsi (1991) stated that although gangs are a rational 
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response to irrational circumstances (e.g., lack of alternatives, poor socioeconomic status, lack of 
opportunities), BC gang members make seemingly irrational choices in life circumstances that 
appear to be otherwise rational (McConnell, 2015). In other words, some BC gang members 
rationally choose the gang lifestyle as a means to satisfy their needs. This is an important 
distinction because in other countries, being excluded from nice restaurants would not deter gang 
members. In Vancouver, gang members are often motivated by glamorization, while in other 
places, gang members are motivated for more basic instincts, such as survival and protection. 
With regards to characteristics of gangs, in his research in British Columbia, Gordon 
(1994) noted that half of the youth involved in gangs came from traditional at-risk homes (e.g., 
poverty, substance abuse, poor socioeconomic status), while the other 50% joined gangs for 
financial reasons, status, and power. Furthermore, it has been argued that gang members in BC 
are mostly diverse, multicultural, and typically come from middle-class homes (Gordon, 2000; 
McConnell, 2015). This has also been seen in the research conducted by McCuish, Bouchard, 
and Corrado (2015) where they have also suggested that gangs are distinctively different in BC 
in the sense that they are not ethnic based or from poor socioeconomic environments. Therefore, 
it is important not to generalize the American research to the Canadian context, particularly in 
BC (McCuish et al., 2015). As gangs in BC differ from those in other cities or countries 
(McConnell, 2015; McCuish et al., 2015), it is not surprising to see gangs congregate in 
marginalized neighbourhoods in places like Toronto or Chicago; however, McConnell (2015) 
notes that this is not applicable to the Lower Mainland. He argued that for BC, gang members 
congregated in the local popular restaurants and for that reason, anti-gang initiatives in BC must 
go where the police can target these individuals to reduce violence including in licenced 
premises, such as bars, clubs, and restaurants (McConnell, 2015). 
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Motivational factors for gangs also appear to be diverse depending on what city, province 
or country you examine. In his work, Gordon (1994) researched 41 gang members incarcerated 
in correctional centres in BC and conducted 25 interviews with the inmates. The majority of the 
gang members interviewed were 25 years of age or younger. In his study, Gordon (1994) found 
that majority of the gang members were not pressured into joining gangs but instead joined on a 
voluntarily basis through their connections with youth who were already involved.  
Additionally, research by Descormiers (2013) also examined retrospective self-reported 
and official data gathered from a sample of 73 gang members involved in the Study on 
Incarcerated Serious and Violent Young Offenders in Burnaby, British Columbia. From her 
examination, she found that joining gangs for financial gain was the most prevalent motivation 
among non-Aboriginal males (74%), followed by the desire to gain respect (72.6%), to deal 
drugs (61.6%), to seek protection (53.4%), and to make friends (34.2%), compared to Aboriginal 
participants who noted that they were more likely to be forced to join a gang (Descormiers, 
2013). This is similar to the findings of McConnell’s (2015) research in which he interviewed 
former gang members and found that there was a general perception among his participants that 
gang members in BC were involved in gangs primarily for the money. Moreover, McConnell 
(2015) observed that the gang life-style in BC includes a Hollywood-like persona in which gang 
members are accustomed to a more luxurious lifestyle involving nice vehicles, expensive 
restaurants, attractive women, and VIP access to nightclubs. This notion is also reflected in 
messages by various BC law enforcement agencies that the drug trade is often associated with 
pretty girls, fancy clothes, expensive cars, and lavish parties (CFSEU, 2015).  
Gordon (2000) examined the role of peer group influence and found that when peer 
groups reject gang involvement as being “cool,” it could likely deter vulnerable youth from 
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joining gangs. Moreover, Squires and Plecas (2014) noted that unlike the economically 
marginalized street gangs in the United States, gangs in BC largely comprise of middle-class 
individuals who join the gang lifestyle for material gain and the “coolness factor” (p. 11). 
Similarly, McConnell (2015) observed that a large percentage of gang members in BC were 
motivated by “status, hedonism, and glamour rather than economic necessity or oppression” (p. 
145). This highlights the fact that in BC; gang members are often seen as being “cool” because 
of the luxurious lifestyle and the Hollywood-like persona they exemplify. In order to take this 
cool factor away from these gang members, society needs to reject this lifestyle that gang 
members portray. Programs such as Restaurant Watch not only eject individuals who are 
involved in the gang lifestyle because of the potential for violence they pose but by ejecting 
them, the program attempts to make the gang lifestyle appear less appealing.   
The Presence of Gangs in British Columbia 
Although there is limited research on gangs in Canada, Canadian researchers have begun 
to examine the role of gang activity in the BC context (Schneider, 2009; Beare, 1996; 2013; 
Bouchard & Hashimi, 2017; Bouchard & Nguyen, 2010; Descormiers, 2013; Ezeonu, 2014; 
Gordon, 2000; Gordon et al., 1998; Gravel, Bouchard, Descormiers, Wong, & Morselli, 2013; 
Young 1993; McCuish et al., 2015; McConnell, 2015; Prowse, 2012; Schneider, 2009; Spindler 
& Bouchard, 2011). A significant contribution to the study of gangs specific to BC was the 
research conducted by Young (1993). Young (1993) noted that gangs in BC have come in a set 
of waves. The first wave was reported as early as the 1900’s, with gangs emerging in Vancouver 
in the 1920s called the “corner lounger” who profited from burglaries and thefts with the use of 
firearms (Young, 1993, p. 37). By the mid 1950s, gang activity in Vancouver had started to 
increase when several groups started to form, including the Alma Dukes, Vic Gang, and the Zoot 
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Suits gang (Young, 1993). In the 1970s, Vancouver Chinatown gangs emerged and appeared to 
have international connections to Hong Kong and San Francisco. In the late 1970s and early 
1980s, police in BC identified only a handful of gangs that were known to control the criminal 
markets (CFSEU, 2015). These gangs were dominate in Vancouver until the late 1980s and 
coexisted with other gangs such as the Hells Angels through the 1980s and 1990s. In the 1990s, 
the VPD’s Gang Crime Unit identified a total of 28 gangs in the Lower Mainland (Coordinated 
Law Enforcement Unit, 1993). Interestingly, about 81.3% of those individuals were affiliated 
with a single gang, while 22% were affiliated with two or more gangs (Coordinated Law 
Enforcement Unit, 1993). 
In their study examining gangs in greater Vancouver, Gordon et al. (1998) found that 
geographical locations in BC, such as the Riley Park and Clark Park, were common hangout 
places for many individuals, which then resulted in the creation of gangs in these geographical 
areas. For example, the Los Diablos gang started to emerge in the mid 1980s in a small, middle-
class residential neighbourhood—the Killarney area of South East Vancouver, BC (Gordon et 
al., 1998). These gangs were involved in the use and distribution of illegal drugs and illegal 
importation of cigarettes and beer from the United States (Young, 1993). Gordon et al. (1998) 
noted that the Killarney area of Vancouver was far from a socially disadvantaged neighbourhood 
associated with gangs; however, it was considered to be an area of transition as immigrants 
started to make their homes in the area.  
In 1998, a Canadian Criminal Intelligence Service Annual Report (1998) noted that 
Vancouver was starting to see a greater variety of gangs, including the Big Circle Boys gang 
(also known as Dai Huen Jai), Vietnamese-based gangs such as the Viet Boys, Flying Dragons, 
and the Lotus gang, the latter of which had over 100 members with connections to the Hells 
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Angels and various Indo-Canadian groups. Still, the Hells Angels were described in 1998 as one 
of the most powerful and well-structured criminal organizations in Canada (Canadian Criminal 
Intelligence Service Annual Report, 1998). The five Hells Angels chapters in BC were believed 
to control the drug trade in the province with a specialty in the cultivation of hydroponic 
marijuana. This domination by the Hells Angels in BC continued until the formation of the 
United Nations (UN) gang in Abbotsford, BC, in the late 1990s by a group of high-school friends 
from the Fraser Valley. The UN gang engaged in importing and distributing marijuana and 
cocaine, weapons trafficking, marijuana grow-operations, cross-border trafficking, extortion, 
kidnappings, and dealing drugs (Mercer, 2011). In an infamous bar fight in Abbotsford, BC, a 
UN gang member beat up a Hells Angels member in a bar brawl, which resulted in rivalries 
between the two groups. This event has resulted in continued rivalries between the two groups 
and has been noted to be the cause of significant gang violence in the last decade (Mercer, 2011).  
In more recent years, gangs from the Vancouver area of BC have transitioned into 
different parts of the province, including northern cities, resulting in conflict between the pre-
existing criminals occupying the drug market in those areas and the newcomers (Pearce, 2009). 
Other gangs, such the Red Scorpions, Independent Soldiers, Game Tight Soldiers, 18th Street, 
Bloods, Crazy Dragons, and other Aboriginal gangs have also emerged more recently in BC and 
have attempted to take over the illegal drug trade market in cities around the province. Still, 
Totten (2013) pointed out that the most sophisticated gangs in the history of BC have been the 
Hells Angels, UN, Big Circle Boys, and the Red Scorpions.  
Furthermore, the profile of these gangs is also diverse in nature. A single gang may come 
from various ethnic backgrounds, including Caucasian, Hispanic, East Indian, and Asian. The 
UN gang in BC, for example, is inclusive of all ethnic backgrounds (CFSEU, 2015). A report 
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conducted by the VPD (2010) noted that gangs in BC did not meet the traditional characteristics; 
specifically, gangs in BC did not form and operate along ethnic lines or geographical turfs, nor 
did gang members come from poor socioeconomic neighbourhoods. Instead, gangs in BC 
embraced members from different ethnic backgrounds, did not self-identify with specific colors 
or clothing, and most importantly, did not control specific geographical territories (Bouchard & 
Spindler, 2010; Carrington, 2002; McConnell, 2015; VPD, 2010). Moreover, many gang 
members in BC did not come from impoverished homes and were closely identified as being 
middle-class with access to material benefits and opportunities with which to pursue a pro-social 
life (VPD, 2010).  
The CFESU (2015) estimated that there are approximately 188 criminal groups operating 
in BC and fighting for a share in the province’s illicit marijuana market. Though this paper does 
not intend to examine why there is a presence of gangs in BC, it is important to point out that 
given its geographic proximity to the United States, the province, and particularly the Lower 
Mainland, can be viewed as being economically lucrative for gangs emerging in BC and entering 
into the drug trade.  
The Presence of Gang Violence in British Columbia  
The violence related to gangs in BC has been of significant concern due to it posing 
public safety concerns. It may be argued that BC has a gang problem because of the lucrative 
marijuana cultivation business. Marijuana is the primary industry of profit for BC gangs and 
because of its accessibility and the relative ease with which it is illegally exported and exchanged 
for other illegal drugs and firearms, marijuana has had various gangs in BC fighting for the 
“largest slice of the pie” (Pearce, 2009, p. 18).  
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While Pearce (2009) described that marijuana is considered the number one industry for 
gangs in BC, in 2010, according to Criminal Intelligence Services Canada (CISC), gangs today 
have also started to engage in other illegal activities, such as drug trafficking, prostitution, theft, 
and human trafficking, resulting in violence within the communities and cities in which they 
operate. As various gangs are fighting for a piece of the drug trade, their presence has continued 
to pose a significant threat to public safety (Criminal Intelligence Services Canada [CISC], 
2014). In explaining why new-age gangs participated in violence, Prowse (2012) stated that 
violence occurs when gangs rival for affiliation at the organized crime level, consequently 
resulting in inter-gang rivalries. In addition, she noted that as there is always money to be made, 
gangs will continue to compete against one another in hopes of obtaining the greatest share in the 
illegal drug trade (Prowse, 2012).  
While gang-related violence in BC is not a new phenomenon, the media portrays this 
violence as unprecedented. In fact, prior research contradicts this assertion (McConnell, 2015). 
In his examination of gang activity in the province of BC, Young (1993) found that gang activity 
in BC came in waves as new gangs appeared and fought against pre-existing gangs to establish 
themselves. In their study examining recent trends in gang violence from 2006 to 2012 in BC, 
Bouchard and Hashimi (2017) found that four distinct waves of gang-related homicides could be 
detected, each capturing the peak moments of known gang conflicts. Bouchard and Hashimi 
(2017) drew upon official data from Statistics Canada on gang-related homicides in Greater 
Vancouver to suggest that the periods between 2007 to 2010 were especially lethal compared to 
the other periods (2006-2007 and 2010-2012). In particular, various media outlets identified the 
Surrey Six Massacre in 2007 as the most shocking incident of gang-related violence in BC to 
date. This particular incident left two innocent people dead and four known gang members 
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murdered in a high-rise building in Surrey, BC (Bolan, 2015; Squires & Plecas, 2013). In the 
aftermath of this event, BC saw its highest peak of gang violence in between the years 2008 to 
2009 after a series of high-profile gang homicides made headlines due to retaliation (Bolan, 
2015; Bouchard & Hashimi, 2017; Squires & Plecas, 2013).  
Between October 2007 and October 2008, the VPD noted that there were a total of 14 
fatal gang shootings within the city of Vancouver alone (VPD, 2009b). In 2009, the city of 
Abbotsford, BC, was dubbed as the “Murder Capital of Canada” via various media outlets 
(Totten, 2013, p. 65). In 2009, due to the significant number of incidents involving gang 
violence, in a public statement, the Chief of Vancouver Police Jim Chu noted that although the 
police are never supposed to admit to having a gang problem, the city of Vancouver was in the 
midst of a gang war and public safety was the prominent consideration in police efforts (VPD, 
2009). Not only was BC in the middle of a gang war, but police warned the public that the recent 
violent events were “seen as new rules of engagement for gangsters... and [Gangsters] are now 
shooting each other when they don’t have to” (CBC, 2009). Figure 2 retrieved from Statistics 
Canada (n.d.-b) displays the rate of gang-related homicides in Canada, from the year 1995 to 
2015. 
Figure 2. Homicides in Canada in 2015. 
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From “Homicides in Canada, 2015,” by Statistics Canada, n.d., Chart 5 (http://www.statcan.gc.ca 
/pub/85-002-x/2016001/article/14668-eng.htm). Copyright Statistics Canada, n.d-b. 
 
While Figure 2 does illustrate gang-related homicides in Canada, Statistics Canada (n.d.-
b) noted that the peak for such homicides occurred in 2008-2009. By examining various open 
source media headlines related to gang-related homicides specific to BC, Jingfors, Lazzano, and 
McConnell (2015) also found an increased level of gang-related homicides reported between the 
years of 2008 and 2009 (See Figure 3).  
Figure 3. Annual gang-related homicides. 
 
 
From “A Media Analysis of Gang-Related Homicides in British Columbia from 2003 to 2013,” 
by S. Jingfors, G. Lazzano, & K. McConnell, 2015, p. 5. http://kora.kpu.ca 
/islandora/object/kora:82 
 
Although the above figures display that that the number of gang-related homicides has 
decreased since 2009, there is still ongoing public safety concerns as the numbers do remain 
relatively high compared to those before 2007. As mentioned above, gang members in BC have 
been reported to engage in shootings in broad daylight and often in public venues such as bars, 
hotels, clubs, and restaurants. In addition, gangs in BC have been known to be involved in 
violence involving firearms as many of their attacks have been a result of public shootings (The 
Canadian Press, 2007). In their research, Erickson and Butters (2006) examined gun usage and 
harm to others in order to identify the trends of sub-lethal violence among at-risk youth in 
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Toronto and Montreal. Through interview data, Erickson and Butters (2006) found that 
participation in gangs greatly increases the probability that a youth will be involved in an 
altercation (as an offender or victim) involving a firearm. Similarly, Tita (2007) pointed out that 
longitudinal studies in the USA that looked at gang memberships in various cities indicated that 
individuals who were known to be gang members or involved in gangs were more likely to carry, 
use, and/or be victimized by a firearm. In addition, Statistics Canada (n.d.-a) found that firearm-
related homicides in Canada were more likely to be related to gangs and/or organized crime 
compared to those committed without the use of a firearm.  
In regards to where gang related violence occurs, Tita and Ridgeway (2007) noted that 
gang-related violence tends to be spatially concentrated in and around the activity space of gangs 
such as places where gangs are likely to congregate. Further, Prowse (2012) suggested that when 
gang members know that they are targets of violence from rival gangs, they perceive that the 
safest place for them is in public places, as they hope this will be a deterrent for those pursuing 
them. She goes on to point out that if the only opportunity to target a gang member is in a public 
place (i.e., plain view shootings), rival gangs will seize the opportunity, regardless of the risk it 
may pose to the public (Prowse, 2012). This corresponds to the research done by Jingfors et al. 
(2015), where they found that in BC, the majority of the gang-related homicides occurred in 
public venues as opposed to private areas.  
Gang members in BC have been involved in gang-related violence involving firearms in 
public places such as bars, nightclubs, restaurants, and parks. This underlines the concern British 
Columbians have with gangs and the risk they pose to public safety. Gang-related shootings such 
as the one that occurred at Gotham Steakhouse and Quattro Restaurant in Vancouver, BC, have 
left innocent bystanders as victims of gang violence. As gang-related violence has notably been 
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an issue of public safety in BC, law-enforcement agencies have continued to devote resources to 
help ensure public safety.  
Law Enforcement Efforts to Suppress Gang Violence in British Columbia 
To date, there have been many municipal, provincial, and national efforts to combat 
gangs in Canada, and almost every province has implemented gang-focused public safety 
initiatives (Bolan, 2016). The initiatives in BC date back to 1974, when specialized units were 
first created to target gang violence in BC. The Coordinated Law Enforcement Unit project was 
first implemented as a Joint Forces Operation funded by both the provincial government and the 
Royal Mounted Police (RCMP) and other police forces in the province of British Columbia 
(Knight, 1998). Its creation was important for many police forces as it allowed for this 
specialized unit to transcend the traditional boundaries of jurisdiction. The implementation was 
key as it adapted to the growing number of gangs that were also seen as transcending the 
traditional boundaries. As the Coordinated Law Enforcement Unit formed, one of its main 
mandates was to fight organized crime by conducting highly complex and sophisticated 
investigations related to major drug conspiracies (Knight, 1998). Crimes such as drug trafficking, 
extortion, weapons smuggling, child pornography, kidnapping, fencing of stolen goods, and 
major fraud were some of the priorities. The unit deployed assigned members of the RCMP, 
municipal police departments, and partner agencies such as customs and immigration, Canada 
Revenue Agency, and Ministry of Attorney General, Finance to work together in combating 
gangs (Ministry of Attorney General, 1998). 
Following a review in 2004, the Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit, British 
Columbia (CFSEU-BC) replaced the Coordinated Law Enforcement Unit after recommendations 
to restrict the unit’s focus were made. The CFSEU was a response to the rapid gang violence that 
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was occurring in BC at that time. The unit includes 14 law enforcement agencies, including the 
RCMP and municipal police departments, under one single command structure with oversight 
provided by a Chief Superintendent (CFSEU, 2015). The unit’s integrated approach was 
designed to enhance coordination, to allow for enhanced intelligence sharing, and to tackle the 
challenges that organized crime groups and gangs posed in BC. The CFSEU’s mandate focuses 
on targeting, investigating, and prosecuting organized crime groups and individuals that have the 
potential to pose the highest public safety risk as a result of their involvement in gang violence 
(CFSEU, 2015). Moreover, the unit acknowledges that one of its primary goals is to educate the 
public and youth about the effects of gang violence (CFSEU, 2015).  
Similarly, municipal police departments such as the VPD have also created their own 
gang crime units that are designed to investigate and suppress all forms of gang and associated 
organized crime in the city (VPD, 2017). In addition, the unit also promotes programs dedicated 
to address and deter youth involvement in gang activity. The unit also works closely with other 
municipal and national law enforcement agencies to collaborate and share intelligence. 
Currently, the VPD Gang Units enforces Anti-Gang Patron Ejection Programs, such as the 
Barwatch program and the Restaurant Watch program in downtown Vancouver. These programs 
allows for officers to eject inadmissible patrons from bars and restaurants. Similarly, the city of 
Abbotsford, once dubbed the murder capital of Canada, also had its police department create a 
Gang Suppression Unit in 2010 (Abbotsford Police Department, 2017). Since then the 
Abbotsford Police Department has been active in arresting gang involved individuals, gathering 
and sharing gang intelligence, and effectively enforcing anti-gang messaging and programming 
(Abbotsford Police Department, 2017). Furthermore, the unit also enforces the Barwatch 
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program, in order to discourage and ultimately prevent patrons from engaging in unlawful and 
uncivil behaviour in and outside of licensed establishments.  
Larger cities in BC, such as Surrey, have also experienced their fair share of gang 
violence that has been covered in the media over recent years (The Canadian Press, 2016). As a 
result of Surrey’s gang-wars over the illicit drug-trade market, the Mayor of Surrey made a 
public announcement in 2016 that gang-related shootings had tarnished the city’s reputation (The 
Canadian Press, 2016). Similar to other policing agencies, the city of Surrey has also 
implemented a specialized unit, the Surrey RCMP’s Gang Enforcement Team to deal with the 
issue of policing gangs. The main responsibilities of this unit include reducing the risk to public 
safety and participating in prevention programs for youth, such as the Wrap program, Code Blue, 
and the Youth Police Academy (The Canadian Press, 2016). To date, the city of Surrey has not 
implemented inadmissible patron programs such as Restaurant Watch or Barwatch. 
While police efforts have continued to work at deterring and supressing gang violence, 
the Canadian legal system has also toughened its response to organized crime and gangs. For 
example, in the late 1990s, the Criminal Code underwent two considerable changes linked to 
organized crime as a response to gang wars in Quebec (Skinnider & Policy, 2006). In 1997, the 
Criminal Code was amended to redefine organized crime and to allow for the criminalization of 
certain activities associated to organized crime (Katz et al., 2011). The amendment of the 
Criminal Code included various anti-organized crime measures including criminalizing 
activities, such as money laundering and proceeds of crime (Skinnider & Policy, 2006). The 
measures taken by the Canadian government were made in consultation with police departments 
across the country and were specifically aimed at targeting criminal gang activity. While the 
criminal justice system has attempted to deal with the issue of gangs, there still continues be a 
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need for anti-gang strategies that encompass prevention, intervention, and suppression, given that 
gangs continue to pose a threat to public safety.  
Gang Prevention, Intervention, and Suppression  
There is a large body of literature on responses to gangs (Curry & Decker, 2003; Decker 
& Curry, 2000; Klein, 2011; Spergel et al., 1994). In their work on juvenile gangs in Australia, 
Cunneen and White (2007) argued that there were two broad approaches to gang response and 
gang prevention. First, coercive approaches are based on the notion that unpleasant consequences 
of crime and violence is a way of keeping people in line with law enforcement. This approach 
includes zero tolerance policing, private security, private policing, checking curfews, electronic 
surveillance, and anti-gang legislation (White, 2007). The second component focuses on a 
developmental approach, including enhancing the opportunities for young persons so they are 
motivated to participate in activities that are reflective of their own interests and needs rather 
than feel that they must join a gang in order to belong to a group. This approach requires 
educational programming, treatment programs, and programs to enhance social/life skills (White, 
2007).  
White (2007) indicated that in order for anti-gang programs to be successful, stakeholders 
and policy makers needed to consider four important elements and adopt a comprehensive 
approach to deterring gangs. First, the community needs to identify the problem and recognize 
gangs or individuals involved in illegal or violent activities. Second, program developers needed 
to identify the source of the problem by carefully examining the situation at hand. Third, they 
must develop general strategies to reduce group conflicts and the propensity to commit crime, by 
addressing factors such as poverty, racism, lack of jobs, inadequate family support, or social and 
economic infrastructures. Fourth, there needs to be programmatic approaches at the community 
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level, specifically involving the community to discourage gang memberships and minimize any 
hero worship of gang leaders (i.e., gang leaders that youth might idolize).  
Spergel et al. (1994) at the University of Chicago conducted one of the first 
comprehensive national surveys on group responses to gang problems in the United States. 
Spergel et al. (1994) found that that a model consisting of prevention, intervention, and 
suppression approach to combating gangs in the United States was deemed to be the most 
effective. Still, Decker (2008) stated that prevention has been the most popular strategy in 
responding to gangs for the last century. He indicated that the goal of prevention is to deter 
youths from joining gangs. In addition, prevention can be further divided into two types: primary 
prevention and secondary prevention (Decker, 2008). Primary prevention consists of targeting 
entire communities that have high rates of gang memberships or violence. Secondary prevention 
targets only the youth who display early signs of gang membership or other behavioural 
problems (Decker, 2008). Decker argued that intervention strategies work by intervening with 
youth who are on the fringes of gang membership or in the early stages of gang membership. 
Last, one of the more prevalent anti-gang strategies is suppression. Suppression is formally 
conducted by law enforcement and can include sharing intelligence about gangs, targeting and 
apprehending specific groups of offenders and using gang injunctions or civil ordinances to 
prevent gang associations (Decker, 2008). This approach allows for officials to crack down on 
gang-involved persons, by strictly enforcing curfews, increasing patrolling around high-risk gang 
areas, and having policies for preferred prosecution, which takes some of the discretion out of 
the hands of the prosecutor. Decker (2008) also argued that although suppression appears to be 
the strategy most frequently used by law enforcement, it is less effective than prevention and 
intervention because gang problems are larger than what suppression can solve. In other words, 
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suppression resources are not large enough to cover all of the needs of youth who are at risk or 
already involved in gangs, nor can it suppress all of the gang crimes that occur (Decker, 2008).  
After examining various anti-gang programs, Howell (2000) also reinforced the 
importance of anti-gang strategies by highlighting a multi-faceted approach. Howell (2000) 
indicated that when considering anti-gang programs, stakeholders needed to use multiple 
strategies (prevention, intervention and suppression) and multi-agency initiatives (i.e., 
community policing, gang task forces, inter-governmental task forces, local and state initiatives) 
to be the most effective. Moreover, Howell (2000) stated that programs that were considered to 
successfully prevent, intervene, and suppress gangs had a significant level of community 
collaboration and crime prevention activities (White, 2007). 
This three-pillar approach is relevant to the Restaurant Watch program. It can be argued 
that the program models the prevention aspect by deterring the general public from engaging in 
the gang lifestyle by exemplifying that gang members will be ejected or denied entry at popular 
establishments. Moreover, gang members that are getting ejected from dining establishments are 
often embarrassed and this reinforces the “uncool” aspect of being in gangs, as Gordon (2000) 
spoke to, ultimately leaving a deterrent effect on others. In respect to intervention, the program 
allows the police and the community to intervene and remove inadmissible patrons from licensed 
premises before violence occur. Finally, from the suppression aspect, the program gives police 
the authority to arrest and/or search, gather intelligence, and use municipal injunctions such as 
the British Columbia Trespassing Act (2010) to eject gang members out of restaurants. The 
suppression component of the Research Watch program is an important aspect because not only 
does it allow police officers to arrest and search people, but it sends the message that the police 
are coming down hard on gang members in areas where they typically would be left alone 
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(restaurants, bars and clubs). By continuously ejecting inadmissible patrons from restaurants, the 
police and the restaurant industry are sending gangsters the message that they are not welcomed 
in such establishments.  
Although the Restaurant Watch program is the only one of its kind, it is similar to anti-
gang programs such as Project Ceasefire and London’s Shield Project as it takes a ‘pulling 
levers’ approach to some extent. Pulling levers suppression strategies are problem-oriented 
policing strategies that follow the core principles of deterrence theory and are designed to target 
specific groups (i.e., gang member).  Most of the programs influenced by the pulling levers 
strategy, have demonstrated to have a positive deterrent impact on crime (Kennedy, Braga, & 
and Piehl, 1997). Both Project Ceasefire and London’s Operation Shield Project have used 
suppression as its main tactic, but also rely on the three pillars approach. In effect, the focus of 
this program is also to deter gang-related violence.  
Similarly, the Restaurant Watch program can also be viewed as having some similar 
components as those of pulling levers. Within the context of the program, police officers are 
taking a bold and a forceful approach of continuously targeting gang members and ejecting them 
out of dining establishments in hopes to deter them and increase public safety. Moreover, the 
Restaurant Watch program has not only been enforced by the police, but also restaurant owners 
who are sending the same message to gang members that—if you are a gang member, you are 
not welcomed in their establishment, consequently resulting in a deterrent effect. As Project 
Ceasefire was seen to be effective, a similar version of this program has also been implemented 
in the United Kingdom to reduce gang-related violence.  
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The Boston Gun Project’s Operation Ceasefire  
The Boston Gun Project (also known as Project Ceasefire) was a problem-oriented 
policing initiative designed to respond to the growing rate of homicide amongst youth in the 
streets of Boston (Kennedy, Braga, & and Piehl, 1997). To date, Project Ceasefire is considered 
one of the most important police responses and, importantly, it was known to have a strong 
community component (Currey, Decker, & Pyrooz, 2014). In the beginning of the mid 1980s, 
youth homicides in the city of Boston rose to unprecedented highs and victimization rates had 
tripled for young black males (Kennedy, 1996). Gangs and gang activity increased in the city of 
Boston, and the violence involved guns, gun assaults, gun carrying, and firing shots (Kennedy, 
1996). By 1990, the city’s homicides rates were deemed out of control and were driven by gun 
violence from gangs. The police expressed that they were overwhelmed and the former 
commander of the Boston Police Department, Lieutenant Detective Gary French, announced that 
there were at least six to seven shootings daily and that police found themselves attending 
multiple crime scenes on a regular basis (Kennedy, 1996). Supported by the National Institute of 
Justice, Project Ceasefire was designed to establish inter-agency working groups that worked in 
collaboration with the criminal justice system, examined various research approaches to see why 
youth were involved in violent offences, developed interventions that would impact homicides, 
and finally evaluate the interventions (Kennedy et al., 2001). With the collaboration of 
participating agencies, Project Ceasefire included two main elements that were deemed to be the 
most effective: a direct law-enforcement attack on illicit firearms traffickers who were supplying 
to youth, and an effort to generate a strong deterrent to gang violence in Boston (Kennedy, 
1996).    
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The emphasis on law enforcement to deter gang violence, also known as the “pulling 
levers” approach was the idea that law enforcement would pull every legal lever available to 
deter violent behaviour; specifically, gun violence of chronic gang offenders (Kennedy et al. 
1997, p. 2). This involved engaging in notification meetings between law enforcement, 
prosecutors, community members, and the gang members themselves. The purpose of these 
meetings was to explain the legal ramifications for individuals who continued to participate in 
this type of violence. By using the pulling levers strategy, the goal was to find mechanisms that 
could consequently produce a deterrent effect (Kennedy et al., 1997). Similarly, the Restaurant 
Watch program attempts to pull every lever possible to come down on gang members and inform 
them that there will be consequences for the lifestyles they chose, which includes being ejected 
from establishments, constantly watched by the police, and possibly arrested in accordance to the 
British Columbia Trespassing Act (2010). 
Another important aspect of the project was Operation Nightlight in which police and 
probation officers teamed up together to conduct curfew checks and home visits on the most 
chronic offenders. Conducting curfew checks and home visits was a strategy to send the message 
that these individuals were being closely watched. With the combination of the above strategies, 
law enforcement and stakeholders wanted to deliver an explicit message that violence would not 
be tolerated (Kennedy et al., 1997). Evaluations of the program suggested the Ceasefire 
interventions reduced youth homicides significantly, as well as shots fired, and gun assaults in 
the city of Boston. 
Although the curfew checks and home visits are not something the Restaurant Watch 
program encompasses, police do conduct random walk-throughs in restaurants to check for gang 
members and assert their presence to deter gang members in this manner. Moreover, by the 
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police being present in participating restaurants, gang members may feel that not only are the 
police watching them, but they are also being targeted, via ejection, from participating restaurant 
establishments who also do not want them in their establishments.  
 
London’s Operation Shield  
While London’s homicides rates are reportedly lower than those in the United States, a 
report by the Mayor’s Office of Policing and Crime (MOPAC) suggested that gangs were 
responsible for 40% of all of the shootings in the capital and 1% of all of the serious violence 
and stabbings (MOPAC, n.d.). Similar to the programs in the United States, such as Project 
Ceasefire, London also recently implemented a program to tackle gang violence. In spring of 
2015, London implemented a pilot project, Operation Shield, in collaboration with the Mayor’s 
Office of Policing and Crime (MOPAC), the Trident Gang Crime Command, and other local 
councils. The project was formed from the group violence intervention (GVI) model, which has 
been adapted by the United States and used in various cities (e.g., Project Ceasefire) (Densely & 
Squier-Jones, 2016).  
Operation Shield aims to be a multi-agency community-led program focused on 
deterrence and a collaborative enforcement approach in an effort to reduce group-related 
violence. The program focuses on three components of the GVI model: (a) consequences for 
violence, focusing on enforcement on chronic offenders that continue committing violent 
offences; (b) community violence, having the community reinforce the message that violence 
will not be tolerated; and (c) providing help for those who to want to exit the criminal lifestyle 
and provide the avenue to do so (MOPAC, n.d.). Operation Shield allows for the Metropolitan 
Police Services Trident team and local authorities to bring criminal sanctions to known gang 
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members if they carry out a serious crime (Densely & Squier-Jones, 2016). Penalties consist of 
going to prison, gang injunctions banning them from certain parts of the capital, mandatory 
employment training courses and even ejection from social housing. Individuals who come to the 
attention of the police in such circumstances will be fast tracked through the criminal justice 
system for faster sentencing (MOPAC, n.d). It is noted that this program has yet to be evaluated 
and as a result, its effectiveness cannot be determined at this time.  
Though this literature is not an extensive overview of the phenomena of gangs in BC, it 
highlights the issue of gang violence in BC. In response to this violence, the Restaurant Watch 
program was implemented to address gang violence in a collaborative partnership with the 
community and the Vancouver Police Department.  Although the Restaurant Watch program 
does not aim to reduce the rates of homicide such as Operation Ceasefire, or reduce the number 
of gang-related shooting such as those attempts in London’s Operation Shield, it does encompass 
the approach that both these programs utilize; the community and police working together to 
deter gang-related violence.   
Theoretical Perspective 
Various dominant theoretical perspectives can be used to help explain the perceived 
effectiveness of the Restaurant Watch program. Particularly relevant to this thesis are the 
Routine activities theory and Deterrence theory, both of which provide insight into 
understanding the connection of gang violence and how to prevent it.  
Felson and Clark (1998) argued that most criminological theories focus on understanding 
why some people may be more criminally inclined than others. However, in addition to 
understanding the propensity for criminality, it is also important to acknowledge the role of the 
environment and how environmental influences facilitate behaviour (Felson and Clark, 1998). 
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These theories assert that everyday activities can place individuals in environments or situations 
where they are more or less likely to have contact with the offender, thus increasing the risk of 
victimization (Finkelhor & Asdigian, 1996).  
Cohen and Felson’s (1979) routine activities theory suggests that three elements need to 
be present for a crime to occur: a motivated offender, a suitable target, and the absence of a 
capable guardian. This macro level theory asserts that the rate of crime increases when these 
three components converge in space and time. In other words, the everyday activities that people 
engage in make some people more likely to be perceived as a suitable target by a motivated 
offender. Furthermore, it is important to note that in addition to the intent to commit a crime, the 
offender must be able to carry out his desire to commit crime (Akers & Sellers, 2012). Second, 
suitable targets can take a number of different forms depending on the nature of the crime (i.e. 
the particular intent of the offender) and the situational context (i.e. the available opportunities 
(Akers & Sellers, 2012). A suitable target does not necessarily have to be a materialistic object, 
something of value or property, but it can also include another individual. Finally, there needs to 
be a lack of guardianship, which would otherwise increase the risk of being detected (Akers & 
Sellers, 2012). According to Cohen and Felson (1979), the most formal types of guardians have 
previously been law enforcement members. However, other forms of guardianship can include 
CCTV cameras, security systems, physical barriers, and a wide range of environmental 
characteristics that might inhibit offenders.  
Routine activities theory may lend support to understanding the nature of the Restaurant 
Watch program and its overall goals of increased public safety and reduced victimization. The 
suitable targets are the gang members who are directly targeted by rival gang members. The 
reason why the Restaurant Watch program was founded was because of the mere fact that 
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potential targets may also end up including innocent bystanders, caught up in the associated 
gang-violence, for being present at the wrong time and wrong place. The motivated offenders are 
gang members who are looking for the opportunity to take out rival gang members when their 
guard may be down. Unfortunately, given the context explained above as to the expected 
lifestyle of a gangster in BC, restaurants are places where rival gang members are more likely to 
come in contact with one another as gang members in BC enjoy congregating and showing-off 
their luxurious lifestyles by attending popular restaurants, clubs and pubs. This has been evident 
in the some of the shootings within restaurants in BC, where gang members have targeted one 
another because they appeared at the same eatery (Mercer, 2011). While historically, the capable 
guardian may have been provided by the public domain, which may be considered as “off-limits” 
to some gangs given the risk of unnecessarily attracting police attention, in British Columbia, 
motivated gang members have not been deterred by the public. Given this, there was an 
opportunity for the Restaurant Watch program to provide this missing element and, 
subsequently, reduce the level of gang-associated crime.   
Sampson and Lauritsen (1990) argued that membership in gangs involves close proximity 
to fellow offenders and criminal events, and, as a result, the chance of violence and subsequent 
retaliation is high. This has also been seen in some of the gang violence in BC where police have 
previously warned the public of possible gang retaliation between rival group members in public 
places (Bolan, 2012). In reference to the Restaurant Watch program, ejecting gang members out 
of the restaurants removes the element of the suitable targets out of these establishments. 
Moreover, with police officers doing random walk-throughs in the restaurants, gang members 
know that Restaurant Watch establishments have a heavy police presence and, due to this 
capable guardian, gang members would be less likely to engage in violence.   
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Under routine activities theory, the suitable target is removed and a capable guardian is 
provided. Still, it is necessary to deter the motivated offender. Deterrence theory posits that the 
more severe a punishment, the more likely that individual will desist from criminal acts 
(Tomlinson, 2016). The theory relies on the severity, certainty, and celerity of a punishment in 
order to deter individuals. To prevent crime, the criminal law must emphasize penalties to 
encourage citizens to obey the law (Tomlinson, 2016). Punishment that is too severe is unjust 
and may invite rebellion, and punishment that is not severe enough will not deter criminals from 
committing crimes (Hobbes, n.d.). The principal assumptions made by the theory include: (1) 
that a message is relayed to the target group; (2) the target group receives the message and 
perceives it as a realistic threat; and (3) the group makes rational choices based on the 
information received (Hobbes, n.d.). It should be noted that deterrence theory is both a micro and 
macro-level theory (Tomlinson, 2016). In other words, the theory suggests that specific 
deterrence intends to punish the individual at hand, subsequently preventing them from 
committing crime in the future, whereas general deterrence proposes that the punishment of an 
offender serves as an example for others in the general population.  
Deterrence theory can be applied to the Restaurant Watch program as it operates to 
specifically and generally deter gang members from attending participating establishment.  By 
ejecting gang members from popular restaurants, the specific individual is given the message that 
their presence will not be tolerated until their behaviour has changed. Further, the program sends 
a message to current and potential gang members that if you are involved in this lifestyle, you 
will be prohibited from entering specific restaurants in the city of Vancouver. This level of 
focused attention may deter some potential gang members from seeing the lifestyle as glamorous 
and to be desired. 
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Routine activities and deterrence theory can be used to explain the purpose and mandate 
of the Restaurant Watch program in Vancouver, particularly as it relates to deterring 
inadmissible patrons and preventing violence. As these theories suggest, gang members are more 
likely to be victims of violence as a result of retaliation, so removing them for dining 
establishment removes the suitable target and the potential for future violence. Further, the 
Restaurant Watch program provides formal guardianship, in the form of the police, to enhance 
public safety and deter gang members from engaging in violence.  Ejecting inadmissible patrons 
reinforces the message to gang members and the public that if you are associated or involved in a 
criminal lifestyle; you will be ejected from these restaurants, thus providing both specific and 
general deterrence.  
While there is strong theoretical support underlying the objectives and purpose of the 
Restaurant Watch program, the program has not yet been evaluated. Thus, there is a need for 
exploratory research to discuss the motivations for developing such a project, describe the 
process involved in creating the program, and assess the perceptions of those participating in the 
program. The next chapter describes the methodology associated with the current study. 
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
This study was qualitative in nature and proposed to be an exploratory study on the 
perceptions of the effectiveness of the Restaurant Watch program in Vancouver, BC. This 
chapter outlines the research design, participants, procedure, and method of analysis. 
Research Design 
As the purpose of this thesis was to qualitatively examine the perceptions of the 
effectiveness of the Restaurant Watch program in Vancouver, BC, a purposive sampling 
technique was used to generate the sample of key program stakeholders from both the police and 
restaurant sectors who participated in semistructured interviews.  
As this was an exploratory qualitative study focusing on an under-researched topic, three 
preliminary themes were explored to look at the perceived effectiveness of the Restaurant Watch 
program: (a) the program’s effect on public safety; (b) the importance of partnership and 
dialogue; and (c) the deterrence of inadmissible patrons. A semi-structured interview schedule 
was designed to explore these themes in depth. The themes focused on: 
• knowledge of the program;  
• knowledge of how the program operated;  
• perception of how the program works to deter gang-related violence within 
participating establishments;  
• perception of how the program is effective in decreasing gang-related violence within 
participating establishments;  
• how the program is benefiting the participant’s organization;  
• how the program is working to increase public safety; 
• participant’s views on the strengths of the program; 
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• participant’s views on the weaknesses of the program; and  
• recommendations for program improvement.  
Additional questions related to the participants’ demographic and professional 
background were asked in order to ascertain the participant’s title, current position, previous 
position, and years of experience in their field. A total of 11 semistructured questions were asked 
(see Appendix A), and follow-up questions were asked where necessary to obtain greater depth 
of understanding.  
Participants 
In total, 15 participants were interviewed. Although the sample size was small, it is 
important to note that these individuals were identified as being key stakeholders in the 
Restaurant Watch program, and their knowledge and experience provided rich data regarding 
their experiences with and perceptions of the effectiveness of the program. The participants 
included: (a) police officers with the VPD, who had current or past experience enforcing the 
Restaurant Watch program in Vancouver, BC; (b) restaurant personnel who had decision-making 
authority, specifically, owners or managers whose establishments were enrolled in the Restaurant 
Watch program; (c) the Restaurant Watch program creator; and (d) the current Restaurant Watch 
police coordinator. 
Inclusion criteria. To meet the criteria for participation, individuals had to report being 
major stakeholders who were involved in either designing, delivering, receiving, or 
administering the Restaurant Watch program. Further, the participants needed to belong to one of 
two types of stakeholders: (a) police officers who had experience enforcing the Restaurant 
Watch program in Vancouver, BC; or, (b) restaurant personnel who had decision-making 
authority, specifically, establishment owner(s) or manager(s).  
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Exclusion criteria. Police officers who had no experience in the enforcement of the 
Restaurant Watch program were excluded from the study, as they would not be able to provide 
enough information on their experiences in enforcing the program. Similarly, restaurant 
personnel who had no decision-making authority were excluded from the study, as they were not 
key stakeholders and subsequently would likely not be able to provide sufficient information on 
the reasons for operating a Restaurant Watch program in their establishment. 
Recruitment. In order to recruit police participants, the author’s contact information was 
given to a police officer working in the gang unit at the VPD who further distributed this 
contact’s information, along with the Information Sheet for Participants (see Appendix B), which 
explained to officers the purpose, methodology, risk, and benefits of the research. Individuals 
who were interested in participating in the study voluntarily contacted the author directly. This 
author is unaware of the number of police officers or restaurant establishments who received this 
author’s information for the purpose of this study, as this information was not shared with this 
author from the police officer that initially distributed this authors contact information. 
In order to recruit restaurant personnel, the author contacted the Restaurant Watch 
program coordinator via email, providing contact information and the Information Sheet for 
Participants to be further distributed to various restaurant owners who voluntarily wanted to 
participate in the study. Restaurant personnel who were interested in the study voluntarily 
reached out to the author via email.  
Procedure  
In conducting this study, several steps were necessary to take to ensure the research was 
ethical in nature and designed to measure the specific objectives.  
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Ethics approval. Prior to collecting data, the author obtained approval from the 
University of the Fraser Valley’s Research Ethics Board and was granted a certificate of human 
research ethics board approval for this study (see Appendix C). The main ethical concern was 
that participants may experience psychological harm when providing narratives on violent events 
they may have previously been exposed to by gang members. To mitigate this risk, participants 
were informed that they did not have to answer any question that made them feel uncomfortable 
and that they could stop the interview at any time. While it was highly unlikely that the content 
of this interview would be traumatizing, as it did not specifically ask about exposure to gang-
related violence, participants were informed they could withdraw from the interview and could 
connect with counseling services located within their local detachment or could contact the 24/7 
Distress Phone Services Line using the contact information provided on the Information Sheet. 
Informed consent. In order to ensure that participants were fully aware of what the study 
entailed and what was required of their participation, all participants were provided with a copy 
of the Information Sheet for Participants outlining the purpose and nature of the study, the 
methodology and confidentiality of the interviews, and the ability to withdraw from the 
interviews at any time during the process and prior to the thesis submission date of April 30, 
2017.  
Confidentiality. Given the small number of participants involved in the research, it may 
have been possible to identify the participants by their specific responses; thus, the risk of 
violating participants’ confidentiality was a specific concern for this study. To minimize the risks 
to confidentiality, the author assigned a unique code number and then a pseudonym to each 
participant in order to anonymize their interview responses. Participants were informed that their 
names would remain confidential and their responses would be treated anonymously. The author 
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has cited the participants’ quotes verbatim wherever possible in an effort to preserve the integrity 
of their voices; however, all participants were given pseudonyms to protect their real identities.  
Interview process. The participants were informed that the interviews would take 
approximately 45 to 60 minutes of their time. All 15 participants emailed the author with dates 
and times that they would be available to meet. Interviews were then conducted in one of the 
participating dining establishments, public coffee shops, or the main VPD department.  
Participants were instructed via the Information Sheet for Participants that the author 
would be using a voice recorder to record their responses for accuracy when transcribing. All 15 
participants consented to participating and voiced having no concerns with the author using a 
voice recorder, and all signed the Informed Consent acknowledging this understanding. The 
signed forms were held in a lock filing cabinet at the author’s home office and the interview 
recordings were stored on an encrypted password protected USB also locked in the author’s 
home office. All raw data will be shredded in June 2017 at the University of the Fraser Valley.   
The participants were informed that if they had any questions and/or concerns regarding 
the study, Dr. Adrienne Chan, associate vice president of Research, Engagement, and Graduate 
Studies could be contacted, and her information was provided on the Information Sheet for 
Participants. To ensure confidentiality, the author stored the voice recordings on an encrypted 
password-protected USB drive that only the author could access. The author transcribed the 
interviews and then analyzed them for patterns and themes. 
Data Collection and Analysis 
Data collection took place from November 21, 2016, to January 23, 2017. During the 
interviews, the author provided the Information Sheet for Participation, collected the signed 
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Informed Consent, then began the tape recorder to document the interview content. The author 
also transcribed notes electronically on a laptop computer during the interview.  
The author divided the interviews into two groups according to participants’ occupations. 
Group 1 included police officers who had current or previous experience in enforcing the 
Restaurant Watch program; the Restaurant Watch program creator; and the Restaurant Watch 
program coordinator. Group 2 included participating restaurant personnel who had decision-
making authority (i.e., owners, managers, vice presidents, chief executive officers, director of 
operations). To ensure the participants remained anonymous, the author assigned each 
participant a pseudonym. Those in Group 1 (police officers) were given pseudonyms starting 
with the letter V and those in Group 2 (restaurant personnel) were given pseudonyms names 
starting with the letter R.  
The author interviewed four police officers, all of whom had experience working with 
gangs within a policing capacity and who had enforced the Restaurant Watch program in 
Vancouver restaurants (see Table 1). Of the four police officers interviewed, one was the creator 
of the Restaurant Watch program and another officer was a Restaurant Watch coordinator. The 
author also interviewed 11 key stakeholders from the restaurant sector. Their positions are also 
reflected in Table 1. The restaurant participants indicated that they had decision-making 
authority, and the majority of them oversaw multiple locations of establishments in the 
Vancouver, BC, area. Some of the participants indicated that they also oversaw franchise 
locations in cities outside of the Vancouver area. All 11 restaurants participants identified 
themselves as being one of the original members who joined the Restaurant Watch program 
when it was initially established.  
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Table 1: Participant Characteristics 
Alias Position Relevance to Program 
Vincent Vancouver Police Gang Unit Member 
Victor Vancouver Police Gang Unit Member 
Vinn Vancouver Police Gang Unit Member 
Vaughn Vancouver Police Gang Unit Member 
Robert Owner and operator Oversees multiple locations 
Richard Director of operations Oversees multiple locations 
Raymond General manager Oversees one location 
Ronald General manager Oversees one location 
Randy  Maître’d Oversees one location 
Russell Chief executive officer Oversees multiple locations 
Robyn Owner and operator Oversees multiple locations 
Ricky Owner and operator Oversees multiple locations 
Rodney Owner and operator Oversees multiple locations 
Riley Vice president Oversees multiple locations 
Rusty General manager Oversees one location 
 
Coding. The author coded the interviews by listening to the voice recordings, reading the 
transcribed interviews, and grouping different emerging patterns and themes. By taking a 
conceptual analysis approach, the author identified groups of words that related to the specific 
meaning or overarching concept or theme. The author also looked for contradictions, theoretical 
connections, and other arguments that were relevant to the how the Restaurant Watch program 
was perceived to be effective.  
The author examined certain groups of words that were associated with public safety, 
program strengths, weaknesses, future improvements, benefits, and gang violence deterrence. 
Responses that most frequently occurred with the above words or concepts were then 
highlighted. During the analysis of the data, the author sought out commonalities, repetitive 
concepts, and specific responses to the three predominant themes: (a) the program’s effect on 
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public safety, (b) the importance of partnership and dialogue, and (c) the deterrence of 
inadmissible patrons. 
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Chapter 4: Results  
The central research question addressed in this study was assessing the perceived 
effectiveness of the Restaurant Watch program by exploring how the program was deemed to be 
effective and successful from the point of view of the key stakeholders. The author’s research 
objectives were to: (1) explore how the Restaurant Watch program is benefiting the key 
stakeholders; (2) examine how the Restaurant Watch program is viewed as enhancing public 
safety; (3) examine how the participants feel the program is working to deter gang-related 
violence; and (4) to add to the existing literature on anti-gang strategies aimed at keeping 
communities safe from gang-related violence. After analyzing and coding the transcribed 
interviews and identifying re-occurring themes, the author found that three themes emerged from 
the responses given by the two groups of participants. 
Theme 1: The Program’s Effect on Public Safety  
One of the common themes the author found within the interviews with both police 
officers and the restaurant personnel was the idea that the program was primarily focused on 
public safety. Within the context of the Restaurant Watch program, both police officers and 
restaurant personnel viewed public safety as the idea of preventing the public, as well as patrons, 
staff, and management, from being innocent victims of gang-related violence in and around the 
participating establishments. To highlight this, Richard, the Director of Operations of multiple 
locations stated that,  
For us, I think it’s more about the safety of our customers and our staff, and obviously a 
protection for the community as well. And it’s a program that’s worked very well for, not 
just our restaurant, but all restaurants that have got onboard with the Restaurant Watch 
program . . . and it’s just keeping the undesirables out of our location, so our guests and 
customers can feel comfortable eating in any of our downtown locations. 
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Vincent relayed that from a policing perspective, the program was exclusively created as 
a public safety initiative. Keeping the public safe from gang-related violence was the foundation 
of the program and it continues to be so. Vincent added that,  
Police officers who are out on patrol who will sometimes do restaurant walk-throughs, 
[as it is] . . . a public safety initiative. That’s the whole reason it came about. The industry 
didn’t want to have their staff, their customers shot up because there’s some guy in there 
who had a hit on him, or had ripped somebody off the week before, and they’re now 
actively being hunted, as they’re trying to go out and enjoy a meal in a restaurant 
somewhere in Vancouver. So that was the whole premise of it. 
In 2007, the VPD Gang Crime Unit highlighted that open-air violence was common and 
that violent incidents were occurring more often in heavily populated areas like nightclubs, 
intersections, and restaurants (VPD, 2007). Vinn, also a police officer, voiced that ejecting an 
inadmissible patron from participating establishment reduced the likelihood that gang-related 
violence would occur in areas nearby participating restaurants, explaining that: 
Like if they’re not in here [in restaurants], less chances of other gang members or other 
people [being a threat] . . . and so a lot of times they’ll [rival gang members] catch them 
on their way out [of the restaurants]. And so, if they know they’re in the restaurants, they 
[rival gang members] will kind of wait them out until they come and maybe shoot them 
or attack them. So if they’re not here [in the restaurant] its safe.  
Richard, an owner and operator of a participating establishment, relayed that the program 
helped to create a culture where gang members do not feel welcome in their restaurants and as a 
result, it was an effective deterrent to their presence. By deterring inadmissible patrons, 
restaurant personnel felt more confident that neither they nor their customers would be accidental 
victims of gang-related violence. In trying to explain his perspective, Richard stated that: 
[o]ver the years, they’ve created a culture that gang members are not welcome in our 
restaurants, so our customers, in turn, can feel comfortable that they’re not going to 
worry about a drive-by shooting or a fight that’s going to break out in the restaurant, 
because they know that undesirables are not welcome in our restaurants. 
The creator of the program also argued that public safety was the fundamental reason 
why the program was created. Getting restaurants to enroll in the program started with having the 
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conversation of how the program is designed to discourage unwanted individuals from coming 
into participating establishments, as their presence there would pose a public safety concern. He 
emphasized that public safety was predominately the purpose of the program and that: 
[i]f anyone says different, they’re misinformed. . . . We have one focus. When we sign up 
a new owner, it is very clear. “This is a program to dissuade people involved in a certain 
kind of lifestyle from coming into your restaurant. . . . But there is no other purpose than 
for public safety. Restaurant Watch members never get together to voice their concerns 
over changes to licensing or operating hours or anything like that. Never. Their only 
purpose is to come together to talk about keeping out certain guys of their places. It’s the 
only reason they exist. 
From Richard’s perspective, it was important that all restaurant locations from the same 
chain were on board with the program so that their customers would feel comfortable going into 
any one of their locations. Rusty stated that in operating a busy restaurant, he felt a sense of 
responsibility for the safety for his staff and customers:  
I think that it gives people the peace of mind. It helps; at least with me on a staffing point 
of view, it helps me create that safe work environment for the staff. As well here . . . we 
are a very busy restaurant. We serve about 250,000 people a year. And it’s also one of 
those things in the back of my mind that I’ve always thought about, that when you hear 
about gang violence, or you see things that happen or targets that are being placed on 
people or where it’s happening at, you know, it could potentially happen here just 
because of the sheer number of people that come through our door and not knowing. And 
to me, it gives me a peace of mind knowing that, with this program, it’s helped keep 
undesirable characters out of the restaurant, and once again, making sure that the guests 
are taken care of, the staff’s taken care of and that we don’t have to worry. I mean, we 
still kind of worry a little bit, you never know who that person is. But it’s just given me 
that peace of mind. 
Raymond also relayed the importance of community and how establishments had to take 
responsibility to ensure that not only were the staff and the guests safe, but also the community 
around them. Raymond noted that: 
You want to protect the staff and the business and the other guests, but it’s kind of your 
responsibility a bit within the community. There’s a lot of people who live and work, and 
other businesses around us, and it’s your job to do your bit in the area where you are. 
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Regarding the larger business community, Randy felt that the gang-related violence that 
was occurring in and around restaurants in Vancouver negatively influenced people’s decisions 
to go out to restaurants in the area. Although he expressed that this was just his observation from 
within his own restaurants, he believed that the gang-related violence negatively impacted 
restaurants in the larger community as well. Randy highlighted that the program reflected how 
the police considered public safety to be a priority. Specifically, Randy stated that, 
I think it made the public aware of the safety and how much the police wanted to make 
sure that we knew that it was about the public being safe, ‘cause people stopped going to 
restaurants ‘cause there was two or three murders that bang, bang, bang, bang. Like you 
know, very high-end joint, right, like successful restaurant. It killed one totally, and that’s 
bad. That’s sad. These people didn’t do anything to anybody. You know, do your garbage 
homework somewhere else. That’s why we were grateful that they did come and help us, 
rescue us.  
Robert relayed that for him, the program not only helped keep inadmissible patrons out of 
the restaurants but also that the police presence was beneficial as it “diffused” situations and 
prevented them from occurring in the first place. As mentioned in Felson and Clark’s (1998) 
routine theory, the presence of guardianship can effectively deter victimization. Robert conveyed 
that, 
[s]ome of the strengths are the fact that they [police] do keep people out of bars and 
restaurants . . . And also like having their [police] presence around really almost stops 
things from happening, and before something could happen, it won’t. So I think they do a 
really good job that way, defusing a situation even before it happens. 
Rodney, an owner and operator of multiple establishments participating in the Restaurant 
Watch program, underscored an important issue that restaurants deal with—balancing sales and 
public safety. He relayed that at times, some inadmissible patrons, who he referred to as “the 
boys” would “sit down, table of 15, and. . . order the most expensive wine, the most expensive 
food, and the bill would be $3,000, $4,000, $5,000, $6,000” (Rodney, personal communication, 
January 18, 2017). However, for his establishments, the public safety component was prominent. 
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He explained how losing sales from inadmissible patrons did affect his business, but at the end of 
the day, it was about public safety. He stated, 
It’s all about staff, customer safety. . . . Yeah. It’s always about staff and customer safety. 
I mean it was a big hit. You lost part of your sales, but you know what? We made a 
decision, lose the sale, build the business, [rather] than lose the business. And that’s what 
we are protecting. 
Another interesting angle of public safety in relation to the program was how it protected 
staff and management from being targets of violence if they refused service to inadmissible 
patrons. Vincent noted that from a police perspective, they also want to ensure that staff are not 
put at risk, and for that reason, are very cautious in how they approach inadmissible patrons for 
possible ejection. Vincent noted that when police do attend a call from a Restaurant Watch 
establishment: 
[w]e don’t involve the staff, we don’t go up to the manager and be like, “Hey, is it that 
table over there?” pointing to the other side of the restaurant. Because that’s the whole 
reason we have this program, is it takes staff completely out of it. If the guy wants to be a 
dick about it, it’s the police he’s mad at, not the manager for calling it in. So that’s kind 
of the big side of it too. 
Vincent further added that to the idea of staff and patron safety by stating that, 
I think it’s [so] people can go out and feel safe in the City of Vancouver. You don’t have 
to worry about sitting next to a guy who’s had three Duty to Warns, and has been shot 
four times, and is a high-level drug trafficker. I think, for restaurants as well, it’s like 
peace of mind, again, that if something’s going on in there, they call the Vancouver 
Police, we’ll come and deal with these guys. Back in the day, you’d have staff trying to 
tell a full-patch Hell’s Angel, “Uh, can you go?” They shouldn’t have to do that, that’s 
not their job, right? I think that’s a big thing too . . . that it protects their customers, 
protects their staff. Takes staff who, out of it, they don’t have to deal with these guys face 
to face anymore, and this thing about peace of mind that, hey, you’re part of this great 
program and these guys won’t come in there because they know you’re part of the 
program. If they do, they’ll just phone the Gang Unit up or the Patrol and they’ll come 
and kick these guys up for us. 
Robert, who also owns several establishments in Vancouver, BC, all a part of the 
Restaurant Watch program, similarly indicated that by implementing the program, it took the 
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onus off the staff and management who usually dealt with asking people to leave if incidents 
occurred in their venue. Robert explained, 
I’ve been in the business for a really long time in Vancouver, and before Restaurant 
Watch, the onus was left on the owners to have to deal with people that were gang-
related, and what happened was incidents would happen in people’s venues. For example, 
like shootings, assaults, whatever it is, amongst gang members, and being in [the] public, 
there are public targets. But before the restaurant manager or the restaurant owner was 
the one that had to deal with it, and I’ve been in positions where I’ve had guys threaten 
me and say they were going to kill me if I wouldn’t get them a reservation or get them a 
table in the restaurant, right? So before that, before Restaurant Watch, the owners were in 
jeopardy and the police kind of like had their hands tied, and they couldn’t do anything 
about it.  
Rodney, an owner and operator of multiple establishments, noted how afraid his staff 
were in telling gang members that they were not welcome. He described a personal story of his 
nephew being targeted by gang members after denying them entry into the restaurant. Rodney 
stated, 
[l]ike you should see it in the beginning when they started, our manager was scared 
because they were telling them, “You can’t get in,” for example, on some nights, to the 
restaurant when we used to have line-ups in front and these guys are seen . . . we seen the 
same guys on Granville Street that night trying to get into the nightclub. And you’re 
afraid, oh [expletive], this is the guy that I had to tell to leave, because they’re afraid that 
[their] going to beat them. And it happened, like my nephew got beat up badly and he 
was in the hospital, by gangsters. Just some guys that he refused to get them into the 
restaurant. 
Similarly, Raymond explained that before the program was implemented, staff members 
were put in risky situations if they asked certain individuals to leave. Raymond stated that 
[i]t sort of put them [staff] in an awkward [position], because you felt, well, if you called 
the cops you’re going to be the target, like you called the cops on us, you know. And you 
don’t want to be. . . . You know, and when you work in a public place and you have to 
come to the same place every day, it’s not really very easy to hide. Or you’re not in an 
office where you can sort of vanish more. . . . It really sort of take that onus off the 
responsibility of the restaurant, the staff and the management.  
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Theme 2: The Importance of Partnership and Dialogue  
As mentioned above, the Restaurant Watch program is voluntary in nature and it involves 
a partnership between the VPD, Restaurants Canada, BC Restaurant & Food Association 
(BCRFA) and participating restaurant establishments. The concept of maintaining a strong 
partnership alongside an open dialogue was a reoccurring sentiment from the interviews. These 
key components were viewed as being the strengths contributing to the success of the program.  
Vincent noted that the program is a partnership between restaurant establishments and the 
police. In enforcing the program, he takes into consideration the partnership principle and 
attempts to carry out his duties of ejection in the least intrusive manner. Vincent explained that 
it’s a partnership between us [police] and them [restaurants], and we have to be respectful 
of that and kind of limit disruptiveness when we go through these places, and kind of 
cater to how busy it is that night, the history of the place, who we think is actually in 
there. So we’re kind of being as minimally intrusive as possible for their establishment, 
for their business. 
Many participants voiced that having a relationship with the police, getting to know 
them, and having an open dialogue was important. When asked what some of the strengths of the 
program were, Robert noted: 
I think that we have a relationship with all the people that work on the beat or the route, 
whatever you want to call it, where you get to know the cops, you get to know who’s on 
Gang Squad and who’s in the Crime Unit, and if you ever have issues, you can just 
discuss it with them. For example, if they come in a little too aggressive in the dining 
room, you can say, “Hey listen, is there a better way we can deal with this?” and 99.9% 
of the time they listen to you and they make a change and make it so they’re not 
disturbing your business. 
In his response of identifying the strengths of the program, Russell highlighted the 
importance of information sharing and having an open dialogue. Russell relayed that,  
[t]he reason this program, I think, has been so effective is because there’s a couple of key 
guys in that program . . . who at the very ground . . . did a number of things. [They] 
shared honest information to industry, which is the best way to get. . . . If you want 
industry to make a change, be honest with them. Don’t say, “We can’t talk about it right 
now, but . . .” you know.  
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Rusty also reflected on the importance of having an open dialogue and underlined how 
police took the time to explain procedures, train, and share information with participating 
partners. Rusty stated,  
You go in, the VPD actually sits down with the manager or the chef or the Maître d’, 
whomever actually is the contact person for the Restaurant Watch Program in each 
restaurant. They pretty much train or give you an idea of what the program’s about, and 
then they actually train you on how to implement that into your actual location so that 
you can give that information to the staff and the staff can actually be a part of actively 
managing the Restaurant Watch program. 
Richard, who is the director of operations of several participating establishments, 
highlighted how important it was having a strong relationship with the police and community 
and how the program has achieved just that. Richard said,  
[w]ell, I think number one, it strengthened our relationships with the police, and the 
community, for that matter. So I think, beyond anything, it’s been great to secure those 
ties with the police and Gang Task Force. . . . Number two, I think it’s strengthened our 
knowledge with our staff and our management [on] what to look for. So from a conflict-
resolution side, I think it’s actually improved our training, too, through the stores, 
because they just know now what to look for, and knowing that they can call police if 
they feel that they’re not comfortable, I think has been a huge part, too, for us. 
Within the idea of having an open dialogue, Riley, who is the vice president of various 
participating establishments, also discussed the significance of program integrity and trust within 
the partnerships. Riley relayed that for him,  
One thing too is the integrity of the program and the integrity of the police officers, they 
have the trust in the operators, and the operators have the trust in them, and I think that’s 
key, because if you didn’t have that trust, you’d never be able to move forward. They 
come in, they do their job, they shake our hands, they’re very discrete about doing 
whatever, right, and they’re actually really nice about it. Really nice about it . . . and if 
there’s something that we have to be aware of . . . if there’s a fight going on downtown, 
they won’t hesitate to pick up a phone and they will call either me or someone else and 
say, “Hey listen, just be careful. They’re downtown tonight. And be aware.” 
Raymond, who had previous experience with a gang-related shooting at an establishment 
he managed, also touched on the concept of trust, stating that 
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[t]here’s a lot of trust. It really is, the whole foundation of it, I think, it is set up on a trust 
basis. The trust that everyone is signing into this. The trust on the side of the police that 
they trust you that if you commit to this that you are going to call us.  
Richard, who oversees multiple participating establishments, also stressed the positive 
relationship police and restaurants have been able to establish, but also the trust within that 
partnership. When asked to identify strengths of the program, he said,  
I think the relationships with all the managers and police is definitely a strength. I think 
that, because we’ve built such a solid relationship, that I think the trust between us and 
the public and the police has increased significantly. 
Additionally, sharing information about the program and being receptive to feedback was 
also significant in contributing to an open dialogue. Randy stated that, for him, having the officer 
take the time to inform participating establishments about what was going on and provide an 
educational piece helped. Randy conveyed that he found the police to be, 
[v]ery accountable, very responsive to [us]. . . . And again, we do meet once a year for 
sure in a ballroom where a lot of people go, and we get the new who’s who and who’s 
what. Because again, they have to inform us. Like I don’t follow the underworld. Too 
busy running a restaurant. So if they don’t educate me in who’s who and what, then you 
know, I couldn’t be able to help them, and that would be missing the whole point of us 
making sure that everybody’s safe. So they do keep up with us. 
Victor stated that participating establishments and the program coordinator have “two 
meetings a year, and they go over protocol and the basis, and even communicate back and forth 
with restaurants about what’s expected, and what’s not working, what is working”. This 
underlines how communication is a key component of the program and it appears to be 
reoccurring. Rusty also voiced that the information sharing was important for his establishment 
as he described that “the information that they [the police] actually share when you’re at those 
meetings . . . you can actually bring back into the actual restaurant to share with your staff, share 
with the management team.”  
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Victor, a police officer, voiced that it was about having an open dialogue not only with 
the participating restaurants but also with the general public and the inadmissible patrons 
themselves. Victor noted that,  
[m]ost people, I believe, like it, and I’ve seen people, even like people in the business 
community, even famous people out there, “Oh, what is this? This is great. We really 
appreciate this.” And we’re very nice, we don’t walk around like a bunch of robots and 
soldiers, right? We talk to everybody who’s out there, we’re nice to them and we explain 
to them. And that explanation goes a very long way. 
Vincent also added to this and explained how he shares information with the public, if 
and when asked, when enforcing the program so the individual has a better understanding of 
what is going on. Vincent stated that, 
I have people approach me all the time, we’re out in restaurants – bars as well, but we’re 
talking about restaurants – out in the restaurants, they’re like, “What is this?” They have 
no idea. We’ll explain to them why is the Gang Unit walking through this restaurant? I’ll 
explain a little bit about what it is, and they’re like, “That’s pretty cool.” They could be 
from the States, they could be from other parts of the country, they could be from here 
and they haven’t seen us walk through a restaurant before because they don’t go out that 
often. And support is seeing they’re like, once we get to explain to them, like, “I kind of 
like that.” 
Theme 3: Deterrence of Inadmissible Patrons  
Another overarching theme that was apparent throughout the interviews was deterring 
inadmissible patrons from attending participating establishments. As mentioned earlier, the 
gangs in BC differ considerably than those in other cities. In his work, McConnell (2015) 
stressed that gang members in BC have historically been treated as the equivalent to celebrities. 
To build on that notion, some participants in this study described gang members coming in to 
their establishments and spending thousands of dollars because of the lifestyle they are 
accustomed too. Rodney went on to say that some gangsters order expensive liquor and food and 
run up significant bills. To deter these gang members from coming into such establishments, the 
Restaurant Watch program works in a way that it simply removes this opportunity from them. 
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The creator of the program emphasized this in his narrative when he explained how taking away 
certain opportunities for gangs to congregate and/or do business could be seen as a deterrent: 
In the ‘70s, so when you used to have the park gangs, right, Riley Park, Clark Park, those 
kind of gangs, right? We don’t have that anymore. But back then . . . they congregate, 
right, no cell phones, none of that, they congregate around parks and they geographically 
identify themselves. Okay. So take that away. Enforce your Parks bylaw. Enforce your 
ten o’clock curfew on parks. Take that away. Take away the part that lets them 
congregate and do business. If you’re telling me they don’t go anywhere, that they 
literally operate mobile the whole time? Okay. Call the Superintendent of Motor Vehicles 
and find out how far you can push the Motor Vehicle Act. They always rent cars. Okay. 
Tell me what I need to take away their license. Tell me what I need to preload them as a 
prohibitive driver, so it’s arrest on site. This is the part that… I’m not saying that we 
don’t get, but it seems to get lost in the conversation sometimes. Restaurant Watch came 
about this. 
Although the author cannot claim through these research findings that the implementation 
of the Restaurant Watch program reduced gang-related violence, it was evident from the 
interviews that stakeholders felt that they saw less inadmissible patrons in their establishments. 
Robyn, who oversees four participating establishments, stated that: 
[s]ince the start of it, it has been so successful. It’s like unbelievable; actually being 
someone that started with this program probably in my 20s, and then seeing it now and 
the difference in the clientele in a lot of the restaurants in Vancouver is totally different. 
Because these people used to like venture out to downtown. It was like a night out, like a 
special occasion, and they’re intimidating, and they would come in and be flashy and 
loud. And like you barely ever see that anymore. So I feel like the success of weeding 
them out has been huge. 
Ricky highlighted that he also saw less inadmissible patrons in the two establishments he 
owned, saying: 
The last few years have been very rare. Sometimes now I don’t even know our staff’s 
calling, which is fine, I prefer that. So I almost prefer they don’t even contact me, they 
just do it on their own. The need for that has been severely diminished over the years. 
Again, whether it’s because the program’s being effective or because like it’s just the 
way the outside world is going right now. 
Similarly, Rodney, who owns and operates eight participating establishments, also 
echoed similarities and highlighted why inadmissible patrons stayed away. Rodney stated that: 
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We know that they’re [gangsters] not downtown anymore, because it used to be so often. 
Oh God, like we used to be every day there is a table that’s got $4,000. Every day, 
constant, constant. We used to have them coming in three nights, three times a night. 
Right? But now maybe once every three weeks you see somebody in the restaurant. So 
the message has got so loud and clear for them that don’t go downtown, you’re going to 
get harassed, you’re going to get by the cops, you’re going to be asked for your ID. 
Rusty emphasized how inadmissible patron ejections have sent out a message to certain 
individuals that they are simply not welcome in the Vancouver core, and if they did come to any 
participating establishment, they ran the risk of getting ejected. When asked if he felt the 
program deterred gang violence, Rusty stated, 
I think it’s been huge. I think if you remember back when there was the shooting outside 
of Gotham Steakhouse a few years ago, that shooting that took place at the Wall Centre 
in the restaurant there, it definitely, I think, has deterred gang members to actually come 
into the downtown core itself. I think that with all the ejections that have happened over 
the past five or six years, that a lot of the gang members actually have got the message 
that they are not welcome here in the downtown core or in any other restaurants just due 
to the fact that they ran that risk of being ejected. 
One of the participants voiced that because there are fewer inadmissible patrons coming 
into establishment, the police presence was less noticeable. Rusty stated, 
My only concern now is that it just seems like now that Restaurant Watch is so successful 
and we’ve gotten a lot of these characters out of the restaurants, the police presence isn’t 
necessarily as strong as what it was five or six years ago. Lately it seems like we don’t 
get the stop-bys every now and then, we don’t get uniformed officers just walking by, 
you know, just peeking in, asking how things are going, if we want them to them to walk 
around or anything like that. It’s probably been a few months since we’ve seen any 
officers actually inside the restaurant in regards to the Restaurant Watch Program itself. 
Victor, a police officer, also stated there fewer inadmissible patron ejections as opposed 
to when he first started:  
I’d say like when I started in 2009, it was like shooting fish in a barrel. There were so 
many guys. I remember going into places, and leaving guys in ‘cause there was so many 
guys we were kicking out. Now, we’re working real hard for a few ejections. Real hard. 
Vincent, also a police officer, relayed that he also saw a difference in how inadmissible 
patrons acted prior to the program compared to after. In his narrative, he highlighted that prior to 
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the program, gangsters wore a badge of honour and now they are embarrassed when they get 
ejected. Vincent stated, 
Yeah, I think before it was like they wore it like a badge of honor, and that’s from me 
personally seeing it. And now it’s like they’re embarrassed, they don’t want to get kicked 
out. Like you mentioned earlier, right? Like they don’t want to get kicked out, especially 
if they’re paying money to get in for some place. Or they order their food and then pay 
for their drinks, and they’re like, “No. Sorry, you’ve got to go.” And it bugs them now, I 
think, and they’re embarrassed. 
Vinn, a police officer, further adds to the idea of embarrassment:  
They’re pretty much getting also embarrassed too, right? They can’t have a proper 
dinner, whether it be with their girlfriends or their other friends. They want to show how 
much money they have and they want to blow it. So they can’t do it here. And the last 
thing they want to do is get embarrassed by police. 
Moreover, participants felt that the program forced inadmissible patrons out of the city 
because of the mere fact that they were constantly getting ejected from participating restaurants. 
Robyn noted that for her it was about “deterring them [inadmissible patrons] from even coming 
in [to the restaurant] the first place” and now “they’d rather go somewhere where they don’t have 
that program.” Vincent, one of the police officers who enforces the program, noted that “we’re 
for sure pushing them [inadmissible patrons] out…. you’ll see, they’re going to Burnaby, they’re 
going to Surrey, they’re not coming to Vancouver. They’re getting pushed out, 100 percent.” 
Vinn also highlighted this in his response: 
If these targets aren’t inside the restaurants, there’d be less chance of collateral damage 
outside of the restaurants, or inside. And a lot of these guys turn away from coming to 
Vancouver as a whole, because they know they’re just going to get ejected. So they turn 
to other cities. Like I’ve seen them, like Burnaby, Langley, Surrey, Richmond, wherever 
they won’t be enforced. 
In addition, some of the participants noted that the program took a persistent approach in 
ejecting admissible patrons. Vaughn noted that you have to keep the foot on the pedal with a 
program such as this, and the moment that you pull back a little, problems can start to develop 
again. Another participant touched on the persistent approach the program takes in creating a 
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culture where inadmissible patrons are not welcome. Richard highlighted how this approach 
correlated with the fewer numbers of ejections: 
Well, I think over the years, they’ve created a culture that gang members are not 
welcome in our restaurants, so our customers, in turn, can feel comfortable that they’re 
not going to worry about a drive-by shooting or a fight that’s going to break out in the 
restaurant, because they know that undesirables are not welcome in our restaurants. But 
that didn’t happen in the first one or two years, so I think from part, and I think from a 
downtown perspective, I mean, I’m not a stats guy on this part, but compared to other 
jurisdictions, it seems like our gang shootings in the City of Vancouver are probably way 
lower than some of the other municipalities because of that, because we push them out of 
Vancouver. I know it’s the same in Kelowna too because they have a pretty aggressive 
gang approach up there, where they just take them to the bridge, and they just say, 
“You’re not welcome in Kelowna,” and they just kick them out.  
One of the participants conveyed that some inadmissible patrons are so familiar with the 
program and how it operates that they leave establishments when they see police. When asked if 
the program was effective in deterring gang-related violence, Victor noted that, 
[s]ome guys understand. And I don’t know how many times . . . and more and more 
recent, you go to a guy, “Hey.” He goes, “Hey. Okay, I get it, I’ve got to go. I get it.” 
Right? “I get it. I just thought I’d bring my girl out,” and this and that. Right? And you do 
give them the chance, right? “Okay, your food’s on its way. Get your bill.” And like they 
know the program. Like more and more you get guys go, “Hey, I know. I saw you 
walking in, I got my bill already. I’m on my way out.” So yeah, it works. It works very 
well in Vancouver. 
Victor, also indicated that from his experience, 
They know they can’t come downtown. And I’ve heard on wire files where even the 
gangsters go, “We know not to come down. And we know not to come downtown.” 
They’ll straight out say it to us. Yeah, yeah, it’s very well known. 
When asked how the program works to deter gang-related violence, Victor added that he 
believed that, 
[t]he reason [the program] deters gang violence is they know, especially in Vancouver… 
[is that] we’re [the VPD gang unit] here all the time, that we’ve got a team on every 
night, we’re out there, and eventually it gets embarrassing for them, right? And 
sometimes, the only justification that we’ll get is ruining somebody’s meal. Some of the 
bigger level guys who are very organized and high-level criminals, they’re under the 
radar, you know, unless they’re a target on big investigations, the only justice we get is 
kicking them out. We go there, “Get out.” Right? “You have to leave.” You know what I 
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mean, it’s embarrassing for them, they lose credibility, perhaps, in front of some people 
and they’re being kicked out. So it functions so well that people get up. I’ve been to 
places where guys look at us and get up and settle their bills. Guys, they just leave, and 
they know what’s going to happen every time, and they know here there’s no discussion, 
they’re out. 
Vaughn made an important point when asked if the program deterred gang-related 
violence. In his response, he voiced that the program does have an effect but it is unknown to 
exactly what extent. Vaughn said, 
It has an effect. But what the exact effect is? Anecdotally, we’ve heard it. We’ve heard it 
face-to-face, we’ve heard it on wiretap, we’ve heard it through source debriefs. People 
think twice. It may have an impact – not all the time on every same person – but some 
people will sit there and say, “Tonight I’m okay going downtown with my three buddies. 
We might get checked. That’s okay.” “Tonight I’m going out and it’s my fiancée. She’ll 
lose her shit if the police come check us. I’m going to take her somewhere in Burnaby 
instead.” Same person, two different nights. Sometimes it changes the decision, 
sometimes it doesn’t. 
Another police officer also reiterated a similar sentiment to Victor but further conveyed 
that having inadmissible patrons removed from establishments was leaving an impression on the 
younger generation and deterring them from such lifestyles. Vinn stated that,  
[i]t’s also giving kind of the younger generation something to look forward to. Like you 
want to leave a positive example to the youth, whereas, you have these guys wearing 
their flashy jewelry with these girls, they’re all good-looking girls, and they’re throwing 
money away, and they’re objectifying everything. Whereas, when they’re getting ejected, 
the younger generation will see, okay look, I want to actually be able to have a meal here. 
I want to be able to take a girlfriend here, I don’t need to. . . . And I’ve actually talked to 
people, in one of my last ejections, and I’m like this is why we’re doing it, and they were 
protesting it. And so, they kind of understood that, yeah, something I want my kids to 
realize, like hey, it’s not a good idea go in this lifestyle. So deterring, I would say, the 
youth from even . . . or other people from going into this lifestyle.  
Through the narratives, both restaurant and police participants stated that they felt 
Restaurant Watch program deterred inadmissible patrons from dining in the participating 
establishments. As the program exercises the ability to eject inadmissible patrons, participants 
viewed this as a preventative approach to deter the propensity of violence that some gang 
members brought with them.  
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Chapter 5: Discussion 
 
The author examined the perceived effectiveness of the Restaurant Watch program from 
the perspectives of key stakeholders using a qualitative exploratory research design. It was 
hypothesized that the Restaurant Watch program would be effective, as it benefited the key 
stakeholders, enhanced public safety, and deterred gang-related violence from occurring in and 
around participating establishments.  
The Restaurant Watch program is unique and there does not appear to be any similar 
program evaluations from which to draw comparisons. The author reviewed two anti-gang 
projects – Operation ceasefire and London’s Operation Shield – that utilize general and specific 
deterrence strategies, and which are therefore similar in nature, though not in methodology, to 
the Restaurant Watch program. As the literature is limited on programs specifically similar to 
Restaurant Watch, the purpose of this study was to contribute to the existing literature in an 
effort to better understand the benefits of such a program and how it might be improved.  
The main findings from the interviews were valuable because they portrayed the 
previously unheard perspectives of the key stakeholders. The participants stated that the program 
was a public safety initiative designed to keep gang members, organized criminals, and their 
associates out of participating establishments. Moreover, the restaurant participants felt that the 
program was effective in protecting both patrons and management because they observed a 
reduction in the number of gang members attending their establishments. Further, restaurant 
participants felt that the program alleviated the stress that staff encountered when requesting that 
an individual leave the premises, as police were now able to do this within the parameters of the 
program.  
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One of the consequences of ejecting inadmissible patrons from certain restaurants was 
that police felt that they were essentially “pushing” gang members and their associates out of the 
downtown restaurants and into other suburban areas outside of the Vancouver area. This was 
also reflected in the interviews with some of the restaurant participants who noticed more gang 
members dining at similar restaurants outside of the Vancouver area. For instance, one restaurant 
participant stated that his managers at nearby locations often asked why the Restaurant Watch 
program could not be implemented in their establishment, as they had observed an increase in the 
number of gang members dining at their locations. 
In regards to the collaborative partnership, both police and restaurant participants 
reported good lines of communication with one another. Restaurant participants felt that 
attending the Restaurant Watch meetings were beneficial to obtaining information, addressing 
any issues and receiving feedback. Moreover, police participants felt that the restaurant 
participants were consistent in their calls for service. Also, police participants commented 
positively on the proactive nature of the program; they stated that all calls were important, 
regardless if the individual met the criteria for removal or not. Police participants stated that they 
felt restaurants were being observant, alert, and were proactively engaging in the program.  
Both restaurant and police participants felt that the program took a preventative approach 
in that it allowed for the ejection of an inadmissible patron before gang-related violence 
occurred. Both police and restaurant participants stated that this was evident as gang members 
who saw the police enter the establishment would quickly request their bill and depart 
voluntarily. Some of the participants felt that this sent a message to youth about the 
embarrassment associated with being ejected from a restaurant.  
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Three themes emerged from this exploratory qualitative study: (a) the program’s effect on 
public safety; (b) the importance of partnership and dialogue; and (c) the deterrence of 
inadmissible patrons.  
The Programs Effect on Public Safety 
One of the questions posed in this research study was how the program worked to 
enhance public safety. Participants felt that this was an important consideration when creating 
the program, as innocent victims were harmed by the violence intended to target gang members. 
All of the restaurant participants stated that their motivations for participating in the program 
were to increase public safety and prevent gang-related violence. Some of the participants shared 
their concerns about gang members’ criminal lifestyles, which inevitably caused a concern for 
the safety and security of their patrons and staff. 
Perhaps a reason why the participants were concerned about lifestyle is because 
individuals who lead high-risk and deviant lifestyles are more prone to become victims of crime 
(Kennedy & Baron, 1993; Jensen & Brownfield, 1986). Moreover, the interviews revealed that 
participants perceived gang members to be dangerous because of their violent lifestyles. It was 
evident from the interviews that some of the participants felt that gang members were more 
likely to initiate violence by shooting one another in public because of the lack of concern they 
had for public safety. This perception could be related to the previous gang shootings presented 
in the media. Moreover, the participants stated that gang members were more likely to engage in 
violence in public places and with firearms. In fact, two of the participants, whose establishments 
had been targeted by gang violence, stated that a firearm was used. This is an important 
consideration for the reputation of such establishments  
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The concern for violence in public places was supported by Prowse (2012) who 
suggested that when gang members know they are targets of violence, they often perceive public 
places as the safest place to be. Unfortunately, if the only opportunity to target a gang member is 
in a public place (i.e., plain view shootings), rival gangs will often seize the opportunity, 
regardless of the risk to the public (Prowse, 2012).  This suggests that gang members are not 
being effectively deterred by the likelihood of being caught and punished. However, from a 
routine activities theory point of view, Restaurant Watch provides added deterrence to the 
motivated offender in that by allowing for the capable guardian to engage in an ejection of an 
inadmissible patron from a restaurant, they are removing the suitable target, and thus decreasing 
the chance that crime and violence will occur.  
Regarding the capable guardian, the author found that a consistent police presence was a 
significant contribution to why the program worked so well, as participants noted that the police 
were constantly targeting the same individuals over and over again (ejecting the same group of 
gangsters out of restaurants). This is similar to the literature where police utilized suppression as 
one their tactics to reduce gang related violence in other anti-gang projects, such as Boston’s 
Operation Ceasefire and London’s Operation Shield. Similarly, by removing an inadmissible 
patron from a Restaurant Watch establishment, the program is taking a “pulling levers” 
approach. In other words, although these places (restaurants) are generally welcoming to the 
public, the restaurant establishments and police have found a way to target this particular group 
of individuals and remove them, thus removing the suitable target and deterring the motivated 
offender. 
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The Importance of Dialogue and Partnership 
Most of the participants commented on the importance of open dialogue and partnership 
between organizations. Both the VPD members and the restaurant establishments felt that their 
level of communication with one another was extremely valuable and contributed to the overall 
effectiveness of the program. The restaurant participants perceived their working relationships 
with the police to be beneficial, especially when police shared non-sensitive information on gang 
members and provided context to the associated gang violence. One participant noted that 
although the police continued to be mindful of not disclosing sensitive information, the police 
were able to share some (i.e., active gang members in the city, updates on gang-related 
shootings, and areas of the city where gang members frequently congregate), with the 
restaurants. 
Restaurant participants felt that by sharing information, police were able to inform the 
staff about particular individuals who were publically mentioned in the media, provide updates 
on gang conflicts in the city, and inform the establishments of gang members’ propensity for 
violence. From the interviews, restaurant participants felt that the knowledge they received from 
the police and the information they often shared was enough to make determination of whom 
they felt would be inadmissible patrons. Also noted by the restaurant participants was the fact 
that the restaurant industry is close-knit and recognized the same group of gang members who 
enjoyed coming into their establishments. The interviews revealed that not only did restaurants 
have collaborative relationships with the police, but also with other restaurants that were apart of 
the program. It was apparent that when restaurants would communicate with one another, they 
would provide each other with a forewarning if gang members were spotted in participating 
establishments.  
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All of the participants in the study commented on how the strong partnerships and open 
dialogues they had with one another contributed to the success of the program. Police 
participants felt that this information was important because it allowed them to reallocate 
resources or focus more on restaurants that were seeing an increase in inadmissible patrons. This 
is consistent with the literature on information sharing and how it can positively impact the 
decision making process within organizations. For instance, Plecas, McCormick, Levine, Neal 
and Cohen (2011) noted that information sharing in the criminal justice system is a process that 
includes providing information to various other individuals/organizations for strategic and 
operational decision-making. The findings from this study reaffirm the importance of ongoing 
information sharing to effective crime reduction. 
This partnership and open dialogue also sends a message to gang members that the 
restaurant industry is collaborating with the police to prevent and respond to gang violence. This 
type of collaborative relationship demonstrates that the two are working together to on a 
common goal – to ensure public safety. From a routine activities theories perspective, it could be 
argued that once these two groups are able to share information effectively, they present a 
stronger ‘united capable guardian’ with an enhanced ability to deter motivated offenders, such as 
those that attend Restaurant Watch establishments. As the Restaurant Watch collaboration 
between the police and community has been perceived to be effective in providing a united front, 
other multi-agency collaborations should review these successes in information sharing to 
determine how they too could benefit from engaging in public safety strategies similar to those 
of Restaurant Watch.  
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The Deterrence of Inadmissible Patrons 
The participants noted that the program was well recognized in Vancouver and that gang 
members knew what to expect if they attended a Restaurant Watch establishment. Participants 
stated that the majority of people dining in participating establishments were informed that the 
establishment is a part of Restaurant Watch program. Moreover, all participating establishments 
place a Restaurant Watch sticker on the front door to let the public know of their participation in 
the program. All of the restaurant participants commented that after they joined the program, 
they felt that the number of gang members dining at their establishments started to decrease. 
Moreover, restaurant participants stated that currently, the number of calls to police about an 
inadmissible patron have also decreased, suggesting that fewer and fewer gang members are 
coming into these establishment. This shows that since the implementation for the Restaurant 
Watch program, participants are noticing a decrease in the number of inadmissible patrons 
attending their establishment, thus reducing the risk of violence.  
It was noted that both police and restaurant participants felt the program sends a 
‘message’ to gang members that they were not welcomed in Vancouver restaurants regardless of 
how money they had. This is similar to the fact that participants in the interviews felt gangs in 
BC often came into establishments feeling entitled (wanting the best VIP table, getting special 
reservations, paying extra for services) because they felt having money would get them that. This 
is consistent with the literature of how gangs in BC have been noted to glamorize the idea being 
in a gang, dine at popular restaurants, spend large amounts of money at restaurants, bars, clubs 
and most frequently, get treated like celebrities (McConnell, 2015). The interviews revealed that 
both the police and the restaurants were on the same page about wanting to eject gang members 
regardless of how much money they spent in their restaurants. This demonstrated that although 
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some restaurants understood that financially, gang members were more likely to spend money at 
their establishments due to the lifestyles they have, having gang members in their establishment 
was not worth the public safety risk. 
Additionally, participants felt that by the very act of ejection, gang members felt a sense 
of shame and embarrassment because they have previously been treated celebrities. This can 
very well explain why some gangsters avoid coming to Restaurant Watch establishments because 
they are embarrassed that restaurants—once a place where they could show off their money and 
dine luxuriously – are now the same place where they are being ejected from in public. 
Moreover, ejecting gang members from popular restaurants also sets an example to the public 
and others that no matter how much money you may have or however glamorous your life may 
be, if you are a gang member you will get ejected from participating establishments. The 
message that the Restaurant Watch program sends to gang members can be viewed from the lens 
of deterrence theory in which the ejection itself severs to be a specific deterrence for gang 
members in the sense that they are not welcomed in some establishments, but also as a general 
deterrence where the ejections send a message to the public that if you are involved in this 
lifestyle, you will also be ejected.  
Although the Restaurant Watch program can be viewed as have a deterrent effect, it is 
still important consider how it is only applicable to the city of Vancouver. Inadmissible patrons 
may indeed be deterred from attending restaurants in the city of Vancouver, but by no means are 
they deterred from attending restaurants that are located outside the city of Vancouver, who are 
not participating in the program. 
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Chapter 6: Recommendations, Limitations,  
Policy Implications and Future Research 
 
Recommendations  
Possible Implementation of Restaurant Watch in Neighboring Cities 
The Restaurant Watch program, originating from within the city of Vancouver, appears to 
be one of a kind. Although similar programs such as Barwatch have previously been 
implemented in jurisdictions across the Lower Mainland, the Restaurant Watch program is 
independent of Barwatch, and operates free of charge and on a voluntary basis. Some of the 
participants in the study stated they felt the program was ejecting inadmissible patrons out of 
Vancouver restaurants and into neighbouring cities who do not enforce the program. Moreover, 
restaurant participants who oversaw multiple dining locations in within the province also noted 
that their staff members were making fewer calls for service to police under the Restaurant 
Watch program in Vancouver. Instead, they indicated that other locations (outside of Vancouver) 
were seeing an increased number of gang members in cities such as Surrey, Burnaby, Port 
Coquitlam and Langley. With that being said, the legal authority of the Restaurant Watch 
program is applied from the British Columbia Trespassing Act (2010), which can be viewed as 
being applicable to all restaurant establishments in the province of British Columbia. Future 
research should gauge the interest in the possibility of implementing similar programs in 
jurisdictions beyond Vancouver to see if they would be perceived effective to any extent.  
Enhanced Program Training for General Duty Officers 
Restaurant participants noted that they felt the general duty police officers were less 
familiar with how to carry out an ejection compared to the gang crime unit police officers. There 
was a general consensus amongst the restaurant participants that although the general duty police 
officers were a lot more familiar with the program since its implementation, the gang crime unit 
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police officers were still more consistent with enforcing the program (e.g., how to approach the 
table, explaining the program to the inadmissible patrons and others, carrying out the ejection 
and consulting with staff). This could very well be because of the fact that it is mainly the gang 
crime unit police officers that attend the Restaurant Watch calls for service and for that reason 
they have gained more experience with the program itself. This author recommends that there be 
more focus given on training the general duty police officers so they are familiar with the current 
agreements put in place and know how to conduct the ejections efficiently, just as well as the 
gang crime unit police officers.  
Continued Enforcement and Police Presence  
Moreover, restaurant participants felt that since they saw fewer and fewer gangsters 
coming to their restaurants, there also appeared to be less of a police presence. In further 
explaining this, some participants stated that one of the tactics the police used to check if gang 
members were dining at participating restaurants was to do random walk-throughs in the 
participating restaurants. Participants noted that the officers would come in, check in with the 
managers to see if there were any inadmissible patrons, do a quick scan of the premises and then 
leave the restaurant if there was no one of interest. Some participants felt that now that there 
were visibly fewer gangsters coming into the restaurants, the random walk-throughs conducted 
by police occurred less often. Several participants communicated that although there were fewer 
gang members coming into the establishments, they felt the police should continue to maintain a 
presence by conducting random walk-throughs because it reinforced the message that gang 
members were still not welcomed. Further, some restaurants even voiced feeling concerned that 
because the police were doing less random walk-throughs in some restaurants, gang members 
would resume attending, as the deterrent factor would quickly diminish. As one of the key 
strengths of the program, as identified by the participants, was the component fo sustained 
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enforcement and continuous police presence, this writer recommends the police continue to 
maintain a strong presence in participating establishments to further deter gang members from 
returning back into the restaurants.    
Continued Partnership and Dialogue 
The findings from the study highlighted how important it was that participants had a 
positive relationship with one another in respect to implementing and enforcing the program. 
Participants felt the program’s success was attributed to the fact that both the police and the 
participating restaurants were constantly checking-in with one another, attending program 
meetings, receptive to feedback and that both parties were responsive. Moreover, the fact that the 
police were sharing information with the restaurants that was practical and useful could be 
viewed as an example of the open dialogues the two organizations had with one another. As this 
has also been identified as one of the strengths of the program, this writer recommends that both 
the participating restaurants and police maintain this relationship in order for the program to 
continue to be effective. 
Research Limitations 
Sample Size  
The current study is limited in a few ways. First, the sample size collected in this research 
is deemed quite small considering there are over a 100 restaurant establishments participating in 
the program to date. Due to the sample size being small, this research should not be used to make 
generalizations as to the effectiveness of programs of this nature, but instead should be seen as 
simply providing insight into the perceived effectiveness of the Restaurant Watch program as it 
operates in the jurisdiction of the city of Vancouver. While this author does acknowledge that the 
sample size was small for this study, it is noteworthy to consider that the author was able to 
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interview key stakeholder participants through a connection with a member of the VPD’s Gang 
Crime Unit, Sergeant Keiron McConnell. As such, the restaurant participants interviewed for this 
study were key stakeholders, as all of them reported being part of the group who originally 
formed to discuss and implement the Restaurant Watch program within their establishments. By 
interviewing these key stakeholders, this author was able to obtain participants’ perceptions of 
how they felt the program has evolved over time, from the time that it was first implemented to 
how it operates today.  
Limited Perspective  
 In addition, the current research does not encompass the views of inadmissible patrons 
and regular patrons. This can be viewed as a limitation as this research was unable to provide an 
understanding of how these groups may have been influenced by the program, if at all. It would 
have been interesting to gauge if the program has altered gang member’s decisions as to where 
they spend their leisure time or if they were more inclined or deterred to attend participating 
establishments. Additionally, as this research aimed to look at the perceived effectiveness of the 
program itself, it did not establish how bystanders feel in simply observing gang members being 
ejected out of participating restaurants. This is important to consider because other patrons 
within establishment could have feelings of fear or have personal safety concerns when police 
are trying to eject inadmissible patrons from the restaurants.  
Further, this research did not include the perspectives of gang members or inadmissible 
patrons that may have had experience with being ejected from participating establishments. One 
of the reasons this group was excluded from the research was because this author did not have 
access to this population; as well, felt it was inappropriate due to the concerns regarding safety 
and risk associated with accessing this population. It would be noteworthy to consider this 
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population, as they would have been able to provide valuable insight into how they perceived the 
program was effective from the eyes of individuals who were actually being ejected from 
restaurants. Similarly, this research also did not interview restaurant owners who were not 
participating in the program. For this reason, this study does not encompass views that would be 
beneficial in understanding why some establishments opted to not join the program, as it is 
voluntary in nature.  
Considering the Legal Component of the Program 
Another limitation of this study was that this research did not look at the legal aspect of 
the Restaurant Watch program, specifically if ejecting inadmissible patrons from restaurants 
could violate any rights. In the interviews, some of the participants stated that there was a 
complaint put forward to the Office of the Police Complaint Commissioner (OPCC; 2015) by an 
inadmissible patron due to being ejected from a participating establishment. The VPD did 
respond to this complaint and concluded that there were no violations when conducting the 
ejection. Information on these complaints can be publically found on the internet. Due to the 
nature of this research being limited to exploring the perceived effectiveness of the program, this 
research did not examine if the program has been perceived to violate any fundamental rights.  
Qualitatively Based  
  The current study was exploratory in nature and examined the perceived effectiveness of 
the Restaurant Watch program from narratives obtained via semistructured interviews. This 
research did not examine any statistics or the numbers of ejections that have been made to date 
under the program. This information may have been useful to see if there were any increases or 
decreases in the number of ejections conducted by the VPD throughout the years the program 
was implemented. Although this study only used qualitative data, the interviews with the key 
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stakeholders did provide rich data in assessing how the program was viewed as being successful 
from the perspectives of those who have been invested in the program since its implementation. 
Moreover, stakeholders were able to express any changes in trends prior and post program 
through the course of the interviews.  
Displacement of Violence  
Last, this study did not examine the potential displacement of violence that could be 
caused by ejecting inadmissible patrons out of Vancouver establishments to the surrounding 
cities. Throughout the interviews, the participants noted that more and more, inadmissible 
patrons were getting the message that police and restaurants did not want gang members 
attending the participating establishments. The participants added that because some of the gang 
members were constantly getting ejected by the police from participating establishments in the 
Vancouver area, gang members were often found attending the same restaurant chain but in a 
different city such as in Burnaby, Surrey, Port Coquitlam or Langley. It would have been 
noteworthy to examine if the program is actually displacing inadmissible patrons to restaurants 
outside of Vancouver, BC or if there were alternative reasons why some participants saw a fewer 
number in gang members attending their establishments.  
Policy Implications  
One of the areas that restaurant participants noted that could be improved was training for 
all regular patrol officers to have a better understanding of how to complete the restaurant 
ejections as efficiently as the gang crime unit police officers. Some of the participants noted that 
the gang crime unit started their shift in the latter half of the afternoons, and if they called police 
for service to remove an inadmissible patron before the gang crime unit police officers started 
their shifts, it was usually general duty police officers who attended for the ejection. The 
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participants stated that the gang crime unit police officers were much more knowledgeable about 
the procedures of the ejections as opposed to the general duty officers who may not be as 
familiar. There appeared to be a consensus among the restaurant participants that all police offers 
should be better trained in how to eject inadmissible patrons if a call for service is made from a 
Restaurant Watch establishment. To facilitate enhanced training in this area, workshops 
providing refresher training for general duty police officers on how to enforce the program could 
be beneficial. Additionally, having a procedure manual in place for officers on their laptops 
could also be seen as being practical and convenient.  
Through conducting this study and as confirmed through the police participants, the 
author was made aware that there was no official policy for the Restaurant Watch program. The 
program creator noted that the VPD did not create a policy for this program, as it was not as a 
police-based program, but instead a community-based initiative. For this reason, the VPD did not 
feel that it was necessary to put an internal policy in place. Moreover, it was noted that because 
there was a special Restaurant Watch Authorization Agreement (VPD, 2016) that both the police 
and the restaurants signed (which outlines the objectives, the authorization agreement to remove 
inadmissible patrons, the definition of an inadmissible patron, and procedures for staff), the need 
for an internal police policy in this regard was not deemed necessary. As this research has not 
been able to extensively examine the OPCC’s and the VPD’s responses to developing policy, it 
is outside the scope of this paper to make any recommendations on if and how policy would be 
applicable. As there appears to be no policy in place for the program, it would be beneficial for 
both the restaurants and the VPD to make the Restaurant Watch Authorization Agreement 
publically available so the public, other community organizations and even law enforcement 
agencies can better understand how the program fully works without having a policy in place.  
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Future Research  
One of the key actions of the Restaurant Watch program was the ejection of inadmissible 
patrons. To further understand if the Restaurant Watch program is actually effective in deterring 
gang members from attending restaurants, it would be valuable to look at any available police 
statistics to see how ejections were occurring and if there were any fluctuations within the years. 
Future research in examining if gang members were actually being displaced to different cities 
would be important to understand, as that is where police resources will need to be deployed. It 
may also be useful to conduct further research to determine if the cities surrounding the 
Vancouver, BC, are seeing any increase in violence or attendance of gang members within their 
dining establishments, as a result of gang members being displaced out of Vancouver 
establishments, under the program.  
Through the interviews, it was revealed that although restaurants received some 
information from the police of individuals deemed as inadmissible patrons, it would be beneficial 
to further explore what protocols the restaurants have in place in determining who is deemed as 
an admissible patron and how restaurants come to that conclusion. This would help with 
examining if there is a level of consistency between the different restaurants in how they deem 
someone to be an inadmissible patron. Additionally, the fact that restaurants and the police are 
deeming certain individuals as inadmissible patrons, it would be valuable to look at future 
research in this area to determine if there are any rights violations. 
As discussed above, one of the limitations of this study was that it did not encompass the 
views of gang members or inadmissible patrons who have experience with the program via 
ejection. Due to this author not having access to this population, the views of this group were not 
incorporated into the study. As the Restaurant Watch program focuses on public safety via 
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ejecting inadmissible patrons out restaurants, it would be interesting to see how gang members 
(who are the targets of the ejections) feel the program is working. Further knowledge about the 
ejections being a deterrent or not, from the perspectives of gang members would be valuable to 
consider as it would provide greater insight into effectiveness of the program. Future research in 
interviewing or surveying incarcerated gang members could be deemed beneficial as it would 
allow for them to provide insight into their own experiences with the program.  
One of the strengths of the Restaurant Watch program, perceived by the stakeholders in 
this study has been the partnership and open dialogue between the police and the restaurants. The 
fact that both parties were able to share practical information about the program with one another 
not only enhanced communication but also built trust. There should be more studies determining 
the effectiveness of public-private organizations communicating and sharing information who 
share common goals such as pubic safety, as seen with Restaurant Watch. This would be useful 
as often, there appears to be a lack of collaboration between private and public organizations due 
to restrictions on sharing information, having different mandates and working together. 
Last, research previously discussed in this paper highlights that some of the most 
effective anti-gang strategies are those that encompass a comprehensive approach, which 
includes the involvement of communities. This type of partnership can be viewed from the lens 
of community policing were police and the local community take a collaborative approach at 
crime prevention. The concept of community policing in Canada has been around for several 
decades and by the 1990’s, nearly every police force in Canada had integrated the term within 
their mandates (Horne, 1992). To facilitate community policing partnerships, police departments 
and community partners work together to tackle public safety issues that appear to be the most 
important in the community. This approach has successful in resolving complex social issues and 
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evolving criminal behavior. Program’s such as Block Watch, Neighborhood Watch, Citizens 
Crime Watch, and Road Watch are just a few examples of pre-existing programs that are specific 
to community partnerships with the police. For the city of Vancouver, gang-related violence 
within restaurants was a significant concern for the community alongside the police. Although 
the Restaurant Watch program is a new and an innovative approach to utilizing well-established 
laws to enhance public safety, it does incorporate the same fundamental concepts of those 
‘watch-like’ programs that have been in place for many years.  
The Restaurant Watch program exemplifies a community policing approach where the 
police and the restaurant industry are working in partnership, taking a pro-active approach and 
problem solving via ejecting gang members to deter gang-related violence in the city of 
Vancouver. Considering that the Restaurant Watch program has been perceived to be effective 
by key stakeholders because it relies on the strong working relationship the community and the 
police have developed, future research should consider more community-based policing 
initiatives that work towards crime prevention and public safety.   
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
Gang violence is of significant concern to many organizations that are invested in 
keeping the public safe. The Restaurant Watch program shows that it is not only law 
enforcement agencies who are concerned about public safety but also local communities, such as 
restaurants, who also have an interest in keeping their patrons safe. This study identified some of 
the perceived benefits of the Restaurant Watch program and how stakeholders felt it has 
positively impacted their organizations.  Moreover, it shed light on how the program has had the 
ability to deter gang members from frequently visiting restaurants as police have utilized ejection 
as a means of deterring these individuals. Recommendations on how the program can be better 
enhanced include further training for police officers that are not working in the gang units, 
consistent enforcement and police presence, and continuous collaboration between the public and 
private organizations. Still, as it currently stands, the Restaurant Watch program, with its 
elements of routine activities theory and deterrence theory, appears to be an effective counter-
measure to reduce gang violence and the victimization of innocent members of the public. 
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Appendix A: Interview Questions 
Questions for Restaurant and Police Participants  
 
1. Please explain your position here 
 
2. How long have you been working in your current position for? 
 
3. Are you familiar with the Restaurant Watch Program in Vancouver?  
 
(Follow-up): If yes, what do you know about it? 
 
4. How do you feel the program is working to deter gang-related violence out of 
participating establishments? 
 
5. Do you feel the Restaurant Watch Program is effective in decreasing gang-related 
violence?  
 
(Follow-up): If yes, how? 
 
6. How is the Restaurant Watch program benefiting your organization? 
 
7. How do you feel the Restaurant Watch Program is working to increase public safety? 
 
 
8. What do you feel some of the strengths are of the Bar and Restaurant Watch program? 
 
9. What do you think are some of the weaknesses of the Restaurant Watch program? 
 
10. What component of the Restaurant Watch program do you feel could be improved? 
 
11. Do you have any final comments about the Bar and Restaurant Watch program in 
Vancouver?  
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Appendix B: Information Sheet for Participants 
 
 
 Information Sheet for Participation 
The Effectiveness of the Restaurant Watch Program in Vancouver, BC 
 
Shaveta Gahunia, a Master of Arts in Criminal Justice student at the University of the 
Fraser Valley is conducting a research project on the existing Restaurant Watch Program in 
Vancouver, BC. The purpose of the project is to add to the literature on current public safety 
initiatives targeted to help reduce gang violence. As part of this evaluation, I will be conducting 
one-on-one interviews with individuals that are directly involved in the administrating the 
program. 
The information you provide will form an important part of examining the effectiveness 
of the Restaurant Watch program. However, participation in this project is on a voluntary basis 
and you will need to provide written informed consent to participate prior to beginning the 
interview today. Please note, you can decline participation in this study without repercussion as 
participants in this study will not be individually named nor will their organizations or 
establishments.  
Your participation will involve the completion of a one-on-one interview concerning 
topics related to your experiences with the Restaurant Program, strengths and weaknesses of the 
programs and the effect the program has had on your organization in relation to reducing gang-
violence. I anticipate that the interview will take approximately 45-60 minutes of your time.  
You can withdraw your participation and information from this project at any point and 
you can choose not to answer any individual question that you do not feel comfortable 
answering. If you wish to withdraw information provided during this interview following the 
completion of your participation, please contact Shaveta Gahunia using the information provided 
below. Please note that you can withdraw your information up until the final thesis is submitted 
in March of 2017. Following this, it will not be possible to remove your information from the 
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thesis. If you withdraw your information prior to the final report’s completion, an anonymized 
electronic copy of your interview will be retained for one year, until it will be deleted in June 
2017, along with the other electronic interview copies from all participants. Prior to deletion, all 
electronic copies of the interviews will be stored in the secure encrypted USB flash drive that is 
password protected. The files will be saved using the unique code number assigned to each 
participant, and so no identifying information will be associated with these electronic files.  
While I will be transcribing your responses to the interviews as we discuss them today, I 
will be tape recording the interview, and you will not be personally identified in the final report 
or any presentations associated with this project. The purpose for tape recording your answers is 
to allow myself, the principal investigator in this project, to accurately transcribe the provided 
information. Your individual responses will be kept confidential, all the data will be aggregated 
for analysis and reporting purposes, and your name will not be directly linked to any information 
that you provide today. The completed anonymized interviews will be stored electronically on a 
password protected flash drive that will be in the possession of this researcher at all times, until 
they are deleted in June of 2017. The information you provide today is only accessible to the 
principal investigators where we will assign you a unique identifier that only the principal 
investigators will be able to associate with your name.  
This interview will focus on your experiences with the Restaurant Watch Program in 
looking at the effectiveness of the program itself. Any information that you can share based on 
your experiences will help to inform my final thesis and thesis presentations. The information 
you provide may also be used to develop future academic articles and presentations; academic 
publication, and the UFV website. However, the results and data collected during the course of 
the study remain the property of the University of the Fraser Valley and shall not be published or 
distributed without the written consent of the University of the Fraser Valley. There are no 
anticipated risks to your participation in my study. The ethics of this research project have been 
approved by the UFV Human Research Ethics Board.  
If you would like more information about the results of this study, please contact Shaveta 
Gahunia at [telephone number] or [email address] If you have any concerns about this research 
project, please contact Dr. Adrienne Chan, Associate Vice President of Research, Engagement, 
and Graduate Studies at [telephone number] or [email address].  
- Please separate this page and leave it with the participant – 
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CONSENT FORM: 
 
By signing below I agree to participate in this study, titled The Effectiveness of the Bar and 
Restaurant Watch Program in Vancouver, BC. 
 
I have read the information presented in the letter of informed consent being conducted by 
Shaveta Gahunia at the University of the Fraser Valley. I have had the opportunity to ask 
questions about my involvement in this study and to receive any additional details. 
I understand that I have the right to withdraw from the study at any time and that confidentiality 
and/or anonymity of all results will be preserved. For questions about the study, I may contact 
Shaveta Gahunia. If I have concerns about the ethics of this study, I may contact Dr. Adrienne 
Chan, AVP of Research, Engagement, and Graduate Studies, [email address] [telephone number]. 
 
Name (please print) 
 
Signature 
 
Date 
 
Name of Witness (please print) 
 
Witness Signature 
 
Once signed, a copy of this consent form will be provided to you. 
 
 
This sheet must be attached to the whole letter of informed consent. 
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Appendix C: Ethics Approval 
 
